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The link between economic growth and institutions has been studied for more than ten years. Our 
goal is to take stock of this literature in order to identify more precise and conscious directions for 
future research. We first introduce the reference framework and by means of a simple comparative 
development exercise raise some questions a literature on this field should be able to answer. Being 
aware of the difficulty of the task, we then organise critically all the contributions so as to explain 
each result and the different paths undertaken. Finally, we conclude with several issues we believe 
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The world consists of economies of all shapes and sizes. There are very rich countries and there are 
very poor countries. Some economies are growing rapidly and some are not growing at all. And 
between these extremes, a large number of economies lie. 
There is enormous variation in per capita income across economies; rates of economic growth vary 
substantially across countries, are not necessarily constant over time, and a country’s relative 
position in the world distribution of per capita incomes is not immutable. Countries can move from 
being poor to being rich, and vice-versa. 
With Barro, Baumol, Lucas, Mankiw, Romer, Sala-i-Martin, Solow, Weil
1, the economic
                                                 
1 During the ‘50s, Solow built a model around a production function and a capital accumulation equation. This model, defining the 
steady-state of the economy, the transition dynamics, and the factors of growth, provides a formal interpretation of the growth 
processes. The Solow model appeals to differences in investment rates, population growth rates and exogenous differences in 
technology, to explain differences in per capita incomes. A country is rich if it invests more and has lower population growth rates. 
In an influential paper published in 1992, A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth, Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and 
David Weil evaluated the empirical implications of the Solow model and concluded it performed very well. They then noted that the 
“fit” of the model could be improved even more by extending the model to include human capital, that is, by recognizing that labor in 
different economies may possess different levels of education and different skills. It follows a more precise, detailed, intuition and 
answer about the reasons of the existence of rich countries and poor countries: countries that have a low population growth rate, a 
high level of technology and invest a large fraction of their resources in physical capital and in the accumulation of skills, are rich. 
The countries that fail in one or more of these dimensions suffer a corresponding reduction in income. This represents an effective 
starting point to shed light on the differences in income levels across economies, but how does it perform at explaining differences in 
growth rates? An early hypothesis, known as convergence hypothesis, proposed by economic historians such as Aleksander 
Gerschenkron (1952) and Moses Abramovitz (1986) was that, at least under certain circumstances, “backward” countries tend to 
grow faster than rich countries, in order to close the gap between the two groups. W.Baumol was one of the first economists to 
provide statistical evidence documenting convergence among some countries and the absence of convergence among others. The 
convergence hypothesis is a substantial contributions is the aim is to explain the differences in growth rates of industrialized 
countries; it is less effective if the purpose is to account for the differences in growth rates around the world. Among countries that 
have the same steady-state, the convergence hypothesis should hold: poor countries should grow faster, on average, than rich 
countries. For members of the OECD or the industrialized countries, the assumption that their economies have similar technology 
levels, investment rates, and population growth rates may not be a bad one. This same reasoning suggests a compelling explanation 
for the lack of convergence across the world as a whole: all countries do not have the same steady-states. The differences in income 
levels around the world largely reflect differences in steady-states. Because all countries do not have the same investment rates, 
population growth rates, or technology levels, they are not generally expected to grow toward the same steady-state target. Therefore, 
referring to the principle of the transition dynamics gathers prominence and thanks to this it is possible to maintain that: the further 
an economy is “below” its steady-state, the faster the economy should grow. The further an economy is “above” its steady-state, the 
slower the economy should grow. Mankiw, Barro and Sala-i-Martin have shown that this prediction of the neoclassical model can 
explain differences in growth rates across the countries of the world: the absolute convergence becomes conditional convergence 
because speaking on “convergence” is possible only after having considered the differences between the steady-states. Actually, the 
theories stemming from the neoclassical model focus on shaping the accumulation of physical and human capital. In another sense, 
these theories emphasize the importance of technology. However, though technology is a central component of neoclassical theory, it 
is left unmodeled. Technological improvements arrive exogenously at a costant rate, and differences in technologies across 
economies are unexplained. To overcome this impasse, the endogenous growth theory, instead of assuming that growth occurs 
because of automatic and unforeseeable (exogenous) improvements in the state of technology, aims at understanding the economic 
forces underlying technological progress, incorporating the economic decision of investing in knowledge. An important contribution 
of this work is the recognition that technological progress happens as profit-maximizing firms or inventors seek out newer and better 
opportunities. In this way, improvements in technology, and the process of economic growth itself, are understood as an endogenous 
outcome of the economy. With regard to this, the Romer model, designed to explain why and how the advanced countries of the 
world exhibit sustained growth, endogenizes technological progress by introducing the search for new ideas by researchers interested 
in profiting from their inventions. Romer examines the engine of economic growth in great detail, showing that it comes from the 
intimate nature of the ideas: ideas are different from most other economic goods. Ideas are nonrivalrous and the economy of “ideas” 
is strictly related to the presence of increasing returns to scale and to the imperfect competition. Firms must be able to charge prices 
greater than marginal cost to cover the one-time expense required to create an idea. It is this wedge between price and marginal cost 
that provides the economic “fuel” for the engine of growth. 
Another famous endogenous approach is a model created by Robert E. Lucas. The Lucas model, based on human capital and 
following Solow, assumes a production function in which human capital per person appears as an argument. A policy that leads to a 
permanent increase in the time individuals spend obtaining skills generates a permanent increase in the growth of output per worker. 
In this way, it is possible to quantify to what extent the technological process depends on the R&D activity of the firms and the 
investment in human capital. The R&D activity has as a determinant the fertility of the process of research and the appropriation of 
its results. And the investment in human capital is founded on the return the individuals expect to obtain.                   
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theory accounts for the different fortunes of countries, looking at the rate of investment in private 
inputs, the growth rate of the labour force and the level of technology.  
However, this framework raises additional questions: why is it that some countries invest much less 
than others? Why are capital and skills used so much less productively in some locations? Why do 
some countries fail to adopt new technologies and to organize production efficiently? 
A leading research program points at “institutions”, whose role has been studied, theoretically and 
empirically, for about ten years. Different types of institutions have been considered, different 
levels analysed, various views have emerged, and many conclusions have been drawn.  
The objective of this paper is to take stock of these years of research, of these views, definitions, 
conclusions, and perspectives outlined. This is an ambitious but important task, because I think the 
time is ripe to acknowledge what we have learned in order to identify more precisely directions for 
future research.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the conceptual framework, where 
some definitions and different explanations for the institutional change are offered. Section 3 
organises critically the empirical literature, with its various assumptions and the cross-country 
regressions looking for the “cause” of income differences. Section 4 reviews, by means of some 
empirical evidence, the literature on the development strategies, the different types of institutional 
design required, and the resulting theoretical attempt. Section 5 concludes and provides a number of 
issues that deserve further research. 
Before proceeding and understanding the state of research, a discussion about the institutional 
variables and a look at some data are needed. 
One of the first things that concerns is how “institutions” can be assessed. The next table does the 
trick: it shows some institutional variables and provides a brief description with the relative source. 
The first institutional variables (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and the Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) are 
known as Worldwide Governance indicators. They are produced by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, since 1996, and range from –2.5 to +2.5. Other examples of institutional variables are 
the Political Rights Score, the Civil Liberties Score, and the related Status, from the Freedom 
House, an independent non governmental organization; the Index of Economic Freedom, that 
ranges from 0 to 100, provided by another research institute, the Heritage Foundation; the 
Socioeconomic Conditions, the Internal Conflict, the Investment Profile variables, from the Political 
Risk Service; the Polity Score, the Democracy and the Constraints on the Executive variables, from 
the Polity IV dataset. These variables are just few examples of the institutional dimensions that can 
be caught, but are enough to suggest that the “levels” of analysis could be manifold. Indeed, we 
have variables related to something that can be called “economic institution” (e.g. the risk of 
expropriation, property rights, business freedom), and something that can be called “political 
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Table 1.      Institutional Variables: a brief description 
 
 
VARIABLES  DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Voice and 
Accountability 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 






and Absence of 
Violence 
Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government 







Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy implementation 
and formulation, and the credibility of the government’s 




Regulatory Quality  Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 




Rule of Law  Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 






Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 







Measuring perceptions of the extent to which people are able to 
participate freely in the political process, including through the 
right of vote, compete for public office and elect representatives 
who have a decisive impact on public choices (it is measured 
on a one to seven scale, with one representing the highest 





Measuring perceptions of the extent to which people are 
allowed the freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy 
without interference from the state (it is measured on a one to 
seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of 
freedom, seven the lowest). 
Freedom 
House 
Status of Free, 
Partly Free, Not 
Free 
This status, determined by the combination of Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties ratings, indicates the general state of 
freedom in a country or territory.  
Freedom 
House 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
This index is built upon analysis of 10 specific components of 
economic freedom: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal 
freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from 
corruption, labour freedom. These 10 component scores are 
equally weighted and averaged to get an overall economic 
freedom score for each country. 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Investment Profile  This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment. 
The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, 
each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum 
score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk 
and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk. The subcomponents 
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Constraints on the 
Executive 
This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints 
on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether 
individuals or collectivities. 
Polity IV 
Project 
Polity Score  The Polity conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines 
concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in 
governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually 
exclusive forms of governance. This perspective envisions a 
spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully 
institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, 
authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully 
institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures this 
regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). 
Polity IV 
Project 
Democracy  Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent 
elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens 
in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The 
Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). 
Polity IV 
Project 
Internal Conflict   This is an assessment of political violence in the country and its 
actual or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is 
given to those countries where there is no armed or civil 
opposition to the government and the government does not 
indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own 
people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an 
on-going civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and 
a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to 
Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk. The 
subcomponents are civil war/coup threat, terrorism political 





This is an assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in 
society that could constrain government action or fuel social 
dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and 
a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to 
Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk. The 
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To get to the core and reach for what a theory of institutions should try to explain, let us start with a 
comparative exercise. Table 2 offers the data, taken from the World Development Indicators 
Database, of six economic variables, for different years, to see the dynamics, and for selected 
countries. The countries are Australia, Germany, United States, Lithuania, South Africa, Uruguay, 
Bolivia, Moldova, Sudan, Cambodia, Pakistan and Central African Republic. The economic 
variables are: GDP per capita
2, GDP per capita PPP
3, Gross Capital Formation (as percentage of 
GDP)
4, the Foreign Direct Investment
5 net inflows, and the gross enrollment ratio for primary and 
second education
6. All these variables are supposed to say something about development. Gdp per 
capita is the most famous and, as we will see later, used measure for growth and development; it is 
followed by other two macroeconomic variables, the gross capital formation and the F.D.I. net 
inflows, here considered just to outline a country’s “situation”. In fact, gross capital formation data 
are used to analyse the trends in investment activity, while F.D.I. ones show how a country is 
attractive to foreign investors. Finally, the last indicator, the primary or secondary school 
enrollment rate, is related to a more “human” dimension of development.  
In terms of per capita GDP, the highest values (2007) are those of United States, Australia, and 
Germany (above 30000$), the lowest are those of Cambodia (1800$) and Central African Republic 
(713$). In the middle we have Lithuania, Uruguay, South Africa (between 18000$ and 9000$), 
Bolivia, Moldova, Pakistan, Sudan (between 4000$ and 2000$). For the gross capital formation, it 
is worth noting the increasing pattern of Moldova, the Lithuania’s restoring one, maybe related to 
“transition”, and the Central African Republic’s poor level.  
                                                 
2 GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.  
3  GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to 
international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over 
GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current international dollars.  
4 Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the 
economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, 
and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including 
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks 
of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." 
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation.  
5 Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
This series shows net inflows in the reporting economy and is divided by GDP.  
6 Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, 
and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, 
social science, art, and music.Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary 
level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or 
skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers.                    
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Table 2. Comparative Development: some facts




























Australia  1990  17906.44 16875.48  28.17008 2.654303  107.7775  81.77516 
  1994  17815.99 19441.11  22.96681 1.572037  ..  .. 
  1998  20930.21 23555.05  23.89253 1.521081  100.1464  155.7531 
  2002  19588.87 28012.37  22.94465 4.414036  102.6032  153.3206 
  2005  33087.71 31701.73  26.37343  -5.27564  104.0955  148.5338 
  2007  39066.07 34922.86  27.39267 4.823081  ..  .. 
             
Germany  1990  21583.79 18415.5  23.16685 0.17521  ..  .. 
  1994  26329.72 21715.58  22.47161 0.339674  ..  .. 
  1998  26624.78 24250.97  21.60854 1.081987  ..  .. 
  2002  24445.15 27578.46  17.2734  2.657778  100.5513  99.74553 
  2005  33848.24 31397.09  17.07921 1.471092  101.3572  100.5416 
  2007  40323.71 34401.26  18.31669 1.553742  ..  .. 
             
United 
States  1990  23063.58 23063.58  17.65615  0.84225  104.2533  91.81819 
  1994  26669.73 26669.73  18.11756 0.657357  ..  .. 
  1998  31518.85 31518.85  19.96181 2.059094  101.1791  96.06754 
  2002  36186.3 36186.3  18.07422  0.809879 99.08611 93.02264 
  2005  41825.85 41825.85  19.50776 0.910125  98.44485  94.12464 
  2007  45591.65 45591.65  ..  1.727395  ..  .. 
             
Lithuania  1990  2841.183 8868.051  32.61194  ..  88.81441  95.36402 
  1993  1902.306 5566.598  18.41813  0.44987  ..  .. 
  1996  3120.816 7887.043  25.555  8.342196  ..  .. 
  2002  4074.346 10546.8  22.07159 5.040591  101.6682  101.9239 
  2005  7536.435 14063.37  25.11021 4.009922  94.34824  99.78945 
  2007  11355.56 17575.4  29.52362 5.262012  ..  .. 
             
South 
Africa  1990  3182.214 5636.924  17.73298  -0.0676  106.6793  65.98117 
  1994  3546.669 5802.8  16.8709 0.275752  ..  .. 
  1998  3205.169 6289.4  17.00201  0.409797 116.9612 89.77975 
  2002  2450.499 7142.942  16.05581 0.663106  107.2789  89.63755 
  2005  5168.089 8487.626  18.06236 2.691254  103.1666  95.83035 
  2007  5914.365 9757.427  21.39853 2.030296  ..  .. 
            
Uruguay  1990  2990.37 5050.634  12.20085 0.447303  108.591  81.25109 
  1994  5125.142 6683.25  15.87163 0.943667  ..  .. 
  1998  6745.849 7965.191  15.87011 0.743058  112.1751  88.27739 
  2002  3710.637 7006.632  11.52131 1.422202  110.8085  106.4633 
  2005  5036.343 9265.583  13.13778  5.08987  113.9633  101.3184 
  2007  6960.48 11215.52  15.05478 3.800055  ..  ..                   
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Table 2.  (Cont.) 
 




























Bolivia  1990  729.9133 2216.255  12.53194 0.558799  105.9389  43.98817 
  1994  817.6186 2609.234  14.37119 2.176814  ..  .. 
  1998  1064.908 3079.143  23.60651 11.17152  112.4071  72.32633 
  2002  912.7328 3287.106  16.29467  8.55826  115.5671  86.29672 
  2005  1039.981 3757.512  13.6128  -2.49887  ..  .. 
  2007  1378.518 4206.354  15.18666 1.556543  ..  .. 
            
Moldova  1990  818.672 2786.913  24.89013  ..  87.30364  81.26085 
  1994  386.8661 1249.899  28.82537 0.679545  ..  .. 
  1998  385.2942 1226.811  26.80115  4.60507  ..  .. 
  2002  412.0788 1577.234  21.66018 5.057714  100.7972  83.44441 
  2005  770.8109 2190.453  30.82567 6.381827  97.89131  88.06252 
  2007  1155.78 2551.1  38.17542  11.22367  94.41768  88.55391 
              
Sudan  1990  478.4872 735.4356  11.19658  -0.25087  ..  20.61527 
  1994  445.1992 888.3088  17.39043  0.77522  ..  .. 
  1998  353.4459 1110.028  17.94907 3.295048  ..  .. 
  2002  430.9243 1372.582  19.45637 4.762272  52.85226  29.76364 
  2005  742.1739 1679.02  23.72939 8.415386  56.68552  32.71747 
  2007  1198.994 2086.117  24.24787 5.247025  66.36675  33.35411 
              
Cambodia  1990  .. ..  .. ..  93.68251  30.1154 
  1994  .. 613.681  11.93855 ..  ..  .. 
  1998  281.0556 737.0273  11.83377 7.045182  93.03986  17.9036 
  2002  316.5878 1033.06  18.12452 3.457159  123.8336  22.71787 
  2005  462.5076 1443.397  18.4657  5.905622  125.7553  .. 
  2007  577.9976 1802.473  20.78597 10.38697  119.1997  42.03969 
              
Central 
African 
Republic  1990  494.5209 577.7086  12.30828 0.046914  68.42351  11.14121 
  1994  253.9023 560.3109  11.7  0.422307  ..  .. 
  1998  282.3425 615.5272  13.54  0.725963  ..  .. 
  2002  260.6626 651.6617  8.957957 0.541691  63.86035  11.51952 
  2005  322.0971 644.1791  8.91287  1.267141  60.66166  .. 
  2007  394.1863 713.3417  8.880123 1.589091  70.67095  .. 
              
Pakistan  1990  370.5525 1211.737  18.93537 0.612998  48.78953  21.64507 
  1994  434.6231 1447.595  19.54642 0.811304  ..  .. 
  1998  472.6479 1600.74  17.7112  0.81361  ..  .. 
  2002  499.0036 1786.265  16.58276 1.138205  71.94232  .. 
  2005  702.964 2184.36  19.08125  2.010007 86.18377 28.58179 
  2007  879.4449 2496.12  22.89522 3.732152  ..  32.54099                   
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Referring to the foreign direct investment, the net inflows are high for Cambodia and Moldova. 
Primary school enrollment ratio is low in Sudan, Cambodia, Central African Republic; the 
secondary one in (again) Sudan, Cambodia, Central African Republic, and Pakistan. 
But how are “institutions” in these countries? 
 
 
Table.3 Comparative Institutional Development 
 













1998  1 1 F 
1.92 
(95.7)  75.6 
 
2003  1 1 F 
2.01 
(95.3)  77.4 
 
2007  1 1 F 
1.99 
(96.7)  81.1 
 
2008  1 1 F 
1.9 
(96.7)  82.2 
            
Germany 
1998  1 2 F 
1.82 
(93.8)  64.3 
 
2003  1 1 F 
1.56 
(91.5)  69.7 
 
2007  1 1 F 
1.75 
(92.9)  70.8 
 
2008  1 1 F 
1.65 
(93.4)  70.6 
            
United 
States  1998  1 1 F 
1.61 
(90.5)  75.4 
 




2007  1 1 F 
1.64 
(91)  81.2 
 
2008  1 1 F 
1.65 
(92.9)  81 
            
Lithuania 
1998  1 2 F 
0.58 
(71.1)  59.4 
 
2003  1 2 F 
0.86 
(78.2)  69.7 
 
2007  1 1 F 
0.7 
(74.4)  71.5 
 
2008  1 1 F 
0.64 
(71.6)  70.9 
                                                 

















Africa  1998  1 2 F 
0.95 
(82.0)  64.3 
 
2003  1 2 F 
0.75 
(75.8)  67.1 
 
2007  2 2 F 
0.72 
(74.9)  63.5 
 
2008  2 2 F 
0.75 
(75.4)  63.4 
          
Uruguay 
1998  1 2 F 
0.63 
(72.5)  68.6 
 
2003  1 1 F 
0.48 
(69.2)  69.8 
 
2007  1 1 F 
0.45 
(69.7)  68.4 
 
2008  1 1 F 
0.48 
(68.7)  67.9 
            
Bolivia 
1998  1 3 F 
-0.09 
(56.4)  68.8 
 
2003  3 3 PF 
-0.41 
(40.8)  64.3 
 
2007  3 3 PF 
-0.79 
(22.3)  54.2 
 
2008  3 3 PF 
-0.81 
(19)  53.1 
            
Moldova 
1998  2 4 PF 
-0.25 
(47.9)  53.5 
 
2003  3 4 PF 
-0.63 
(29.4)  60 
 
2007  3 4 PF 
-0.82 
(19.9)  58.7 
 
2008  4 4 PF 
-0.76 
(23.7)  57.9 
           
Sudan 
1998  7 7 NF 
-1.08 
(12.8)  38.3 
 
2003  7 7 NF 
-1.21 
(9)  - 
 
2007  7 7 NF 
-1.15 
(11.4)  - 
 
2008  7 7 NF 
-1.41 

















1998  6 6 NF 
-0.78 
(20.9)  59.8 
 
2003  6 5 NF 
-0.76 
(21.8)  63.7 
 
2007  6 5 NF 
-0.86 
(18.5)  55.9 
 
2008  6 5 NF 
-0.81 
(19.4)  55.9 
           
Central 
African 
Republic  1998  3 4 PF 
-1.46 
(3.8)  - 
 
2003  7 5 NF 
-1.52 
(3.3)  60 
 
2007  5 5 PF 
-1.38 
(4.7)  50.6 
 
2008  5 5 PF 
-1.45 
(3.3)  48.6 
           
Pakistan 
1998  4 5 PF 
-0.65 
(25.1)  53.2 
 
2003  6 5 NF 
-0.55 
(34.6)  55 
 
2007  6 5 NF 
-0.6 
(30.8)  57.2 
 
2008  4 5 PF 
-0.73 
(25.6)  55.6 
 
 
The previous table considers three dimensions: an index of economic freedom, and index for the 
quality of policy implementation and formulation, and a score for the degree of political rights and 
civil liberties. Without meaning to find causalities, the simple reading of the data suggest that the 
countries considered free, mostly or moderately free in terms of economic freedom
8, that is, with a 
score higher than 60, are also free in terms of political rights and civil liberties and show a positive 
values for the government effectiveness variable. These are Australia, United States, Germany, 
Lithuania, South Africa and Uruguay. Symmetrically, those mostly unfree or repressed in terms of 
economic freedom, are partially free or not free for the status of political rights and civil liberties, 
and show negative numbers for the index related to the quality of policy. These are Bolivia, 
Moldova, Sudan, Cambodia, Pakistan, Central African Republic. And these, more or less, have also 
lower levels of per capita GDP and enrollment rates. 
But, even taking the causality for granted, and we will soon see that it is somehow true 
“institutions” affect economic performance, how does it happen? And looking at the institutional 
variables used in the foregoing comparative exercise, could a sort of interdependence within 
“institutions” exist? Which is the relationship between economic policy, political and economic 
institutions? And do human development and civil liberties depend on the nature of a political 
system?
                                                 
8 A score between 100-80 means free, 79.9-70 means mostly free, 69.9-60 moderately free, 59.9 - 50 mostly unfree, and 
49.9-0 repressed.                   
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2.  The Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 What are Institutions? 
  
To answer this question we need to consider the seminal work of Douglass C. North. From the 70’s, 
he did a great work of research to understand what institutions are.  
Institutions are defined as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction.
9 According to North, they consist of both informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights). In a historical perspective, institutions have been devised by 
human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. They define the choice set and 
determine transaction and production costs and, hence, the profitability and feasibility of engaging 
in economic activity. From a dynamical point of view, North observes that they evolve 
incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future. Institutions provide the incentive 
structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change 
towards growth, stagnation, or decline. A crucial distinction is made between institutions and 
organizations. Like institutions, organizations provide a structure to human interaction. Indeed, 
when the costs that arise as a consequence of the institutional framework are examined, we see they 
are a result not only of that framework, but also of the organizations that have developed in 
consequence of that framework. Organizations include political bodies (political parties, a 
regulatory agency), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social bodies 
(churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies (schools, universities). They are 
groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. Both how 
organizations come into existence and they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional 
framework.  
The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not 
necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction. From conventions, codes of conduct, and 
norms of behaviour to statute law, and common law, and contracts between individuals, institutions 
are evolving and, therefore, are continually altering the choices available to us. 
To understand more concretely the role of institutions, we need to take into account North’s papers 
and books related to economic history
10. These publications show how the concepts and definitions 
given before are not simply an exercise of abstraction.  
The closing years of the seventeenth century reveal winners like Holland and England, and clear 
losers such as Spain, France, Italy and Germany. For instance, the failure of the French economy to 
exhibit long-run sustained economic growth is interpreted as a failure of the French state to develop 
an efficient set of property rights. On one hand, property rights in land were established and 
protected. On the other hand, the product market continued, as the result of state policy, to be as 
imperfect as during the late Middle Ages. For Spain, the tragedy of its decline and stagnation is not 
simply an account of depriving minorities of their property (first the Jews and then the Moors). 
Actually, they were symptomatic of the insecurity of all property rights. As the Crown’s financial 
difficulties increased, seizure, confiscation, or the unilateral alteration of contracts were recurrent 
phenomena, which ultimately affected every group engaged in commerce or industry as well as 
agriculture. As no property rights were secure, economic retardation was the inevitable 
                                                 
9 North, “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance” 1990. 
10 North and Thomas, “The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History”, 1973.  
North, “Beyond the New Economic History”, 1974.  
North, “Government and the Cost of Exchange in History”, 1984 . 
North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England” 1989. 
North, “Economic Performance Through Time”, 1994.                   
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consequence. The opposite, North argues, happened for the Netherlands and England. The Low 
Countries were the first important centre of Western European manufacturing. The growth of 
efficient markets allowed the easy importation of raw materials and facilitated the sale of the final 
product for export. The fortunes of the industrial sector and of the area in general were dependent 
upon the Malthusian cycle. When population in Europe grew, so did trade and manufacturing; when 
population fell, commerce and industry also declined. During the population trough of the fifteen-
century, English cloth became a prime competitor. In response, the urban centres of the Netherlands 
began to specialize in luxury and semi-luxury textiles. Rural industry in the Low Countries 
remained of limited importance until 1500. Thereafter, rural manufacture became of increasing 
importance. The rise of commercial activity, the development of an efficient capital market and the 
policy of the government made this possible. North and Thomas observe that the reduction in the 
cost of capital allowed the use of more capital in the manufacturing process; the absence of guild 
regulations in the country allowed the manufacturing process to be free of restrictive guild practices 
and to employ less expensive rural labour. These conditions helped the relatively densely settled 
Dutch countryside to develop according to its comparative advantage and let the Dutch become the 
economic leaders of Europe during the early modern period. Their centrally located geographical 
position and their government, which established an efficient economic organization, account for 
this growth.  
This scenario, North argues, presented England with a continual challenge, since the latter lacked 
the size of France, the foreign endowments of Spain and the efficient institutions of the 
Netherlands. Early in the seventeenth century, England began to construct a New World empire in 
defiance of Spain. During the course of the century, England attempted to imitate the property 
rights and institutional arrangements of the Netherlands. England succeeded, and early in the next 
century supplanted the Dutch as the most efficient and rapidly growing nation in the world. England 
created the first patent law to encourage innovation; experienced the elimination of many of the 
remnants of feudal servitude; developed the goldsmith into a deposit banker issuing bank notes, 
discounting bills and providing interest on deposits; saw the creation of a central bank, with the 
chartering of the Bank of England in 1694. By 1700 the institutional framework of England 
provided a hospitable environment for growth. The decay of industrial regulation and the declining 
power of guilds permitted mobility of labour and innovation in economic activity; this was later 
further encouraged by the Statute of Monopolies patent law. The mobility of capital was 
encouraged by joint stock companies, goldsmiths, and the Bank of England, all of which lowered 
transaction costs in the capital market; the supremacy of parliament and the embedding of property 
rights in the common law put political power in the hands of men anxious to exploit the new 
economic opportunities and provided the essential framework for a judicial system to protect and 
encourage productive economic activity.  
 
 
2.2 Institutional change: the importance of path dependence 
 
That institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and is the key to understand 
historical change
11 comes as a natural consequence of the foregoing reasoning. Indeed, it is a 
complicated process because the changes at the margin can be a result of changes in rules, in 
informal constraints, and in kinds and effectiveness of enforcement. Moreover, institutions typically 
change incrementally rather than in discontinuous fashion. How and why they change incrementally 
and why even discontinuous changes are never completely discontinuous are seen as an effect of the 
imbeddedness of informal constraints in societies. Although formal rules may change overnight as 
the result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints, embodied in customs, traditions, 
and codes of conduct, are much more impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural constraints 
                                                 
11 North, “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance”, 1990.                   
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not only connect the past with the present and future, but provide us with a key to explain the path 
of historical change.  
The starting point of this analysis should focus on the difference between institutions and 
organizations and the interaction between them that shapes the direction of institutional change. 
Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the opportunities 
in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities and, as the 
organizations evolve, they alter the institutions. The resultant path of institutional change is shaped 
by the hold that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations, 
that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions, and the 
feedback process by which human beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set 
(North, 1990). 
The increasing returns characteristics of an institutional matrix, North argues, come from the 
dependence of the resultant organizations on that institutional framework. Both the formal and the 
informal institutional constraints result in particular exchange organizations that have come into 
existence because of the incentives embodied in the framework itself and therefore depend on it for 
the profitability of the activities that they undertake. Incremental change comes from the 
perceptions of the entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do better by 
altering the existing institutional framework at some margin. But these perceptions crucially depend 
on both the information that the entrepreneurs receive and the way they process that information. If 
political and economic markets were efficient, then the choices made would always be efficient. But 
the actors frequently have to act on incomplete information and process the information they 
receive through mental constructs that can result in persistently inefficient paths. Transaction costs 
in political and economic markets lead to inefficient property rights, but the imperfect subjective 
models of the players can make for the persistence of such property rights.  
To analyze institutional change, we first need to explore organizations and the way they interact 
with institutions. Keeping this in mind, North begins by returning to the Coase argument that 
transaction costs are the basis for the existence of the firm. If information and enforcement were 
costless, it would be hard to envision a significant role for organizations. But they are not costless. 
Organizations are defined as purposive entities designed by their creators to maximize wealth, 
income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of the 
society. In pursuing those objectives, organizations incrementally alter the institutional structure. 
They are not, however, necessarily socially productive because the institutional framework often 
has perverse incentives. Organizations are designed to foster the objectives of their creators and are 
created as a function not simply of institutional constraints but also of other constraints. The 
interaction of these constraints shapes the potential wealth-maximizing opportunities of 
entrepreneurs. 
These maximizing objectives of the organization, which have been conditioned by the institutional 
framework, are to be integrated with the development of the stock of knowledge. If we start with 
the neoclassical firm, the only function of management is to select profit-maximizing quantities of 
outputs and inputs, which means determining the quantity and the consequent price that will be 
established. This neoclassical approach came under critical evaluation. In fact, the real tasks of 
management are to devise and discover markets, to evaluate products and product techniques, and 
to manage actively the actions of employees; these are all tasks in which there is uncertainty and in 
which investment in information must be acquired. 
Discovering and evaluating markets, evaluating techniques, and managing employees entail the 
development of tacit knowledge to disclose the complexities associated with problems of 
measurement and enforcement. The kinds of information and knowledge required by the 
entrepreneur are in good part a consequence of a particular institutional context. That context will 
not only shape the internal organization and determine the extent of vertical integration and 
governance structure, but also determine the margins that offer the greatest promise in maximizing 
the organization’s objectives. If the basic institutional framework makes income redistribution the                   
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most profitable economic opportunity, it can be expected a very different development of 
knowledge and skills than a productivity-increasing economic opportunity would entail. These 
extreme examples typify much of economic history. The incentives that are built into the 
institutional framework play the decisive role in shaping the kinds of skills and knowledge that pays 
off. 
Maximizing behaviour of economic organizations therefore shapes institutional change by: the 
resultant derived demand for investment in knowledge of all kinds; the ongoing interaction between 
organized economic activity, the stock of knowledge and the institutional framework; and the 
incremental alteration of the informal constraints as a product of maximizing activities of 
organizations. 
Let us turn now to two fundamental questions of societal and economic change, that is, what 
determines the divergent patterns of evolution of societies or economies, and how we account for 
the survival of economies with persistently poor performance over long periods of time.  
To dealing with these issues, North turns to a body of economic literature that has focused primarily 
on the evolution of technology, but has made analogies to a broader range of questions, including, 
although mostly implicitly, institutional change. He shows that 
technological change and institutional change are the basic keys to societal and economic evolution 
and both exhibit the characteristics of path dependence. Path dependence means that the 
consequence of small events and chance circumstances can determine solutions that lead one to a 
particular path. There are two forces shaping the path of institutional change: increasing returns and 
imperfect markets characterized by significant transaction costs. In a world in which there are no 
increasing returns to institutions, and markets are competitive, institutions do not matter. But with 
increasing returns, institutions matter. With increasing returns, institutions matter and shape the 
long-run path of economies, but as long as the consequent markets are competitive or even roughly 
approximate the zero transaction cost model, the long run path is an efficient one. Given 
noncontroversial assumptions about preferences, neither divergent paths nor persistently poor 
performance would prevail. But if the markets are incomplete, the information feedback is 
fragmentary, and transaction costs are significant, then the subjective models of actors, modified 
both by imperfect feedback and by ideology, will shape the path. At this point, not only both 
divergent paths and persistently poor performance can prevail, the historically derived perceptions 
of the actors shape the choices that they make. In a dynamic world characterized by institutional 
increasing returns, the imperfect efforts of the actors reflect the difficulties of deciphering a 
complex environment with the available mental constructs (ideas, theories, and ideologies). Before 
examining the sources of persistently inefficient paths, North attempts to make the process of path 
dependence clearer. Aware of the fact that history can be seen as a story of incremental institutional 
change involving interplay between the institutional framework and the consequent organizations, 
he stresses that, at every step along the way, there are choices that provided real alternatives. Path 
dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision-making through time: 
it is not a story in which the past predicts the future. 
North then integrates the path dependent character of the incremental change in institutions with the 
persistence of patterns of long-run growth or decline. Once a development path is set on a particular 
course, the network externalities, the learning process of organizations, and the historically derived 
subjective modelling of the issues reinforce the course. But unproductive paths can persist: the 
increasing returns characteristic of an initial set of institutions, that provide disincentives to 
productive activity, will create organizations and interest groups with a stake in the existing 
constraints. They will shape the polity in their interests. Such institutions provide incentives that 
may encourage military domination of the polity and economy, religious fanaticism, or plain, 
simple redistributive organizations, but they provide few rewards from increases in the stock and 
dissemination of economically useful knowledge. The subjective mental constructs of the 
participants will evolve an ideology that not only rationalizes the society’s structure but accounts 
for its poor performance. As a result, the economy will evolve policies that reinforce the existing                   
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incentives and organizations. Because all economies have institutional frameworks that create both 
productive and unproductive opportunities for organizations, the history of any economy will reflect 
some mixed results.  
However, it would be a mistake to think that successful paths get reversed by small events or errors 
and vice-versa. The increasing returns nature of the institutional matrix is made up of a complex of 
interdependent rules and informal constraints that in total determine economic performance. Path 
dependence, hence, means that history matters. Today’s choices couldn’t be understood without 
tracing the incremental evolution of institutions. 
 
 
2.3 Institutional change: quasi parameters and self-reinforcement 
 
Building on a game-theoretic foundation, quasi parameters and self-reinforcement are other 
concepts introduced
12 in literature to offer a dynamic approach to institutions. 
Classical game theory provides a conceptual apparatus for the analysis of self-enforcing institutions. 
However, many features that are usually taken as parameters in the repeated game formulation 
share two properties: they can gradually be altered by the implications of the institution under study, 
and second, their marginal change will not necessarily cause the behaviour associated with that 
institution to change. These features are neither parameters (as they are endogenously changed) nor 
variables (as they do not directly condition behaviour): they are quasi parameters. Because changes 
in  quasi-parameters and their implications are not recognized by the actors, it is necessary to 
consider them as parametric, exogenous and fixed, in studying the self-enforcing property of an 
institution in the short run, but when studying the same institution in the long run they need to be 
considered as endogenous and variable. The changes in quasi-parameters that an institution implies 
can reinforce or undermine it
13. An institution reinforces itself when, over time, the changes in 
quasi parameters it entails imply that the associated behaviour is self-enforcing in a larger set of 
situations, than would otherwise have been the case. A self-enforcing institution that reinforces 
itself is a self-reinforcing institution. But a self-enforcing institution can also undermine itself when 
the changes in the quasi parameters that it entails imply that the associated behaviour will be self-
enforcing in a smaller set of situations. Central to endogenous institutional changes are therefore the 
dynamics of self-enforcing beliefs and the associated behaviour. From this point of view, an 
institutional change is a change in beliefs and it occurs when the associated behaviour is no longer 
self-enforcing, leading individuals to act in a manner that does not reproduce the associated beliefs. 
Conversely, a necessary condition for an institution to prevail over time is that the range of 
situations in which the associated behaviour is self-enforcing does not decrease over time. Unless 
an institution is self-reinforced, it will reach a situation in which the behaviour associated with it is 







                                                 
12 Greif and Laitin,  “A theory of Endogenous Institutional Change”,  2004 
13 They illustrate their dynamic approach to institutional change through the comparison of late medieval Venice ang 
Genoa, looking at the political regime (the institution). Each of the institutions is self-enforcing, but only one is self-
reinforcing. The quasi-parameters considered are the wealth of the cities, the strength of the people, and the social 
identities of the clans. Changes in quasi parameters in Genoa had the effect of undermining political order, making its 
institutions sensitive to relatively small exogenous shifts in clans’strength, trading opportunities, and the level of 
external threat. The opposite changes transpired in Venice, whose institution was self-reinforcing.                   
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3.  The Attempting Literature 
 
 
3.1 Property rights and contracting institutions 
 
One of the most famous attempts to assess the impact of institutions on economic growth, using the 
concept of property rights, is the Knack and Keefer’s 1995 paper
14. The institutional indicators used 
come from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence (BERI). The ICRG variables considered are expropriation risk, rule of law, interpreted 
as proxies for the security of property and contract rights, repudiation of contracts by the 
government as indicator of government credibility, corruption
15 in government and  quality of 
bureaucracy as proxies for the general efficiency with which government services are provided. In 
particular, their reasoning assumption is that in those countries where ICRG records high levels of 
corruption, entrepreneurs are beset by greater uncertainty regarding the credibility of government 
commitments. That is, the same institutions that allow public officials to demand large and arbitrary 
bribes, such as failed law enforcement systems, inhibit those officials from credibly pledging not to 
renege on their future commitments. This discourages investment and encourages forms of 
economic activity that are less vulnerable to expropriation. The indicators from BERI are, on one 
hand, contract enforceability and infrastructure quality, and, on the other, nationalization potential 
and bureaucratic delays. The five ICRG variables and the four BERI variables are aggregated
16 to 
form an ICRG index and a BERI index of the security of contractual and property rights. 
Empirically, in a cross-sectional model, where the specification shows growth as a function of 
initial income, secondary and primary school enrollment, the percent of government consumption in 
GDP, the investment variable and the institutional indicators, these indexes are found to have a 
greater impact on growth than the variables
17 previously employed as proxies of property rights.  
More recently, also Acemoglu and Johnson
18, investigating which institutions are more conducive 
to economic growth, evaluate the importance of “property rights institutions”, which protect 
citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and “contracting institutions”, 
which enable private contracts between citizens. But in particular, this paper is an attempt to learn 
more about the relative importance of contracting versus property rights institutions at the macro 
level. Contracting institutions regulate transactions between private parties such as a debtor and a 
creditor. Both parties to such a relationship may like to deviate from the pre-specified contractual 
terms, and they can only do so because of “failures” in implementation and enforcement. While 
weak contracting institutions can be very costly, citizens also have certain recourses. Most 
importantly, they can change the terms of the contracts or the nature of their activities to protect 
themselves from the worst type of opportunistic behaviour. In contrast, property rights institutions 
are intimately linked to the distribution of political power in society because they regulate the 
                                                 
14 “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross Country tests using alternative Institutional Measure” 
15 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) has explored theoretically two broad reasons why corruption may be costly to economic 
development. The first reason is the weakness of central government, which allows various governmental agencies and 
bureaucracies to impose independent bribes on private agents seeking complementary permits from these agencies. 
Such competing bureaucracies, each of which can stop a project from proceeding, hamper investment and growth 
around the world, but especially in countries with weak governments. The second broad reason that corruption is costly 
is the distortions entailed by the necessary secrecy of corruption. The demands of secrecy can shift a country’s 
investments away from the highest value projects, such as health and education, into potentially useless projects, such 
as defense and infrastructure, if the latter offer better opportunities for secret corruption. These demands can also cause 
leaders of a country to maintain monopolies, to prevent entry, and to discourage innovation by outsiders if expanding 
the ranks of the elite can expose existing corruption practices. Such distortions from corruption can discourage useful 
investment and growth. 
16The aggregation is accomplished through simple addition. 
17 Revolutions and coups, and assassinations. 
18 “Unbundling Institutions“, 2004.                    
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relationship between ordinary private citizens and the politicians or elites with access to political 
power. When property rights institutions fail to constrain those who control the state, it is not 
possible to circumvent the consequent problems by writing alternative contracts to prevent future 
expropriation, because the state, with its monopoly of legitimate violence, is the ultimate arbiter of 
contracts. The most important component of contracting institutions is the functioning of the legal 
system. Differences in both laws and the implementation of laws across countries introduce 
significant differences in the costs of enforcing contracts and consequently in the equilibrium 
contracts and transactions. Property rights institutions, instead, are related to political and state-
society interactions. 
For contracting institutions, they use three measures: an index of legal formalism developed in 
Djankov at al. (2003), an index of the overall procedural complexity of resolving a court case (from 
the World Bank) and the number of distinct procedures involved in the same process (from the 
World Bank). They also use three measures for the property rights institutions: constraint on the 
executive, from the Polity IV dataset, capturing the degree of constraints on politicians, protection 
against expropriation by government averaged over 1985-95 from Political Risk Services, and the 
Heritage Foundation’s private property index which captures the extent to which private property is 
protected against both government and other sources of expropriation. The specification to be 
estimated is a cross-country regression of the outcome of interest (of a country) on a measure of 
property rights institutions and on a measure of contracting institutions. The outcomes of interest 
are four: the level of GDP per capita, which is a good measure of long-run growth; the ratio of 
investment to GDP, which is a measure of whether a society is able to channel money into 
productive investments; the amount of private credit as a percent of GDP as a measure of finance 
provided through the banking sector and trade credit; and stock market capitalization as a percent of 
GDP, which provides a measure of equity finance. The strategy adopted is the two-stage least 
squares with distinct and plausible instruments for contracting and property rights institutions. The 
instruments for property rights institutions are log settler mortality and indigenous population 
density
19, and the one for contracting institutions is legal origin. 
Their empirical investigation reveals that contracting institutions and legal rules, better the set of 
proxies related to contracting institutions, have some effect on the form of finance (the use of equity 
versus debt contracts) and on the stock market development. But they have limited or no effects on 
major economic outcomes, including long-run growth, the investment to GDP ratio, and the overall 
amount of financial intermediation in the economy. Property rights institutions, the proxies 
associated to property rights institutions, have a large effect on all these outcomes.  
 
 
3.2 Causes of Income Differences 
 
3.2.1 Proximate or Fundamental Causes and The Reversal of fortune  
 
One of the first attempts to find the reasons underlying the cross-country output per worker 
differences is by Hall and Jones
20 (1999). They are the first economists that document at a deeper 
level these differences and treat the institutional dimension, called social infrastructure, as 
endogenous. By social infrastructure they mean the institutions and government policies that 
provide the incentives for individuals and firms in an economy. Their measure
21 of social 
                                                 
19 These are related to the Europeans’colonization strategy. Where settler mortality was high, due to the disease 
environment faced by the Europeans, the settlement was not feasible and Europeans developed extractive institutions; 
where it was low, they developed institutions similar to the contemporary institutions in Europe. Where indigenous 
population was high, Europeans “captured” local population, where it was low, Europeans settled and were less likely 
to develop extractive institutions.  (to understand more deeply the role of European colonization, see the following part) 
20 “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?” 
21 This is formed as the average of the GADP index and openness one.                   
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infrastructure is formed by combining two indexes. The first element is an index of government 
antidiversion policies created from data assembled by Political Risk Services that specializes in 
providing assessments of risk to international investors. Two of the categories relate to the 
government’s role in protecting against private diversion are law and order, and bureaucratic 
quality. Three categories relate to the government’s possible role as a diverter, that is corruption, 
risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts. The second element of their 
measure of social infrastructure captures the extent to which a country is open to international trade 
and they refer to the index compiled by Sachs and Warner. To examine the quantitative importance 
of differences in social infrastructure as determinants of incomes across countries, they hypothesize 
a structural model where the dependent variable is, of course, the output per worker (in logarithmic 
terms) and the independent variable is the social infrastructure. The latter is explicitly recognized as 
an endogenous variable and so instrumented. The instruments are various correlates of the extent of 
Western European influence. These are characteristics of geography such as distance from the 
equator and the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe (English, French, 
German, Portuguese, Spanish) are spoken as first languages today.  Their results indicate that 
differences in the independent variable account for much of the difference in long-run economic 
performance throughout the world. The extent to which different countries have adopted different 
social infrastructures is partially related to the extent to which they have been influenced by 
Western Europe.  
Hall and Jones (1999) observe that differences among countries can be attributed to differences in 
human capital, physical capital, and productivity and that these are just a first step in understanding 
differences in output per worker. Their central hypothesis
22 is that the primary, fundamental 
determinant of a country’s long-run economic performance is its social infrastructure and that those 
differences are fundamentally related to differences in social infrastructure across countries.  
The literature has developed a definition for the causes of income differences. Some are defined as 
proximate and some other as fundamental.  Acemoglu, recalling what Hall and Jones call “first 
step”, defines proximate causes as those provided by the standard economic answers like 
differences in physical capital, human capital and technology. Fundamental causes are those able to 
say why some countries invest less than others, fail to adopt new technologies and to organize 
production efficiently. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
23 assert that the two main candidates for the fundamental causes 
of cross-country differences in prosperity are geography and (economic) institutions. 
The geography hypothesis maintains that geography, climate, and ecology of a society’s location 
shape both its technology and the incentives of its inhabitants. 
They present three main versions of the geography hypothesis, each emphasizing a different 
mechanism for how geography affects prosperity. First, climate may be an important determinant of 
work effort, incentives, or even productivity: it stresses the time-invariant effects of geographic 
variables and predicts that nations and areas that were relatively rich in 1500 should also be 
relatively prosperous today. Second, geography may determine the technology available to a 
society. And finally, the third variant of the geography hypothesis links the poverty in many areas 
of the world to their “disease burden”. While the geography hypothesis looks at “forces of nature” 
as a primary factor in the poverty of nations, the institutions hypothesis is about “man-made” 
influences. According to this view, some societies are organized in a way that upholds the rule of 
law, encourages investment in machinery, in human capital, in better technologies, facilitates broad-
based participation in economic and political life by the citizens, and supports market transactions. 
The hypothesis that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of different 
patterns of economic growth is based on the notion that it is the way that humans themselves decide 
to organize their societies that determines whether or not they prosper. Some ways of organizing 
                                                 
22 This hypothesis explains also why their specification for the determination of incomes is parsimonious. 
23 “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”  2005.                   
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societies encourage people to innovate, to take risks, to save for the future, to find better ways of 
doing things, to learn and educate themselves. Others do not. The crucial element for goods 
institutions are enforcement of property rights for a broad cross-section of society, so that a variety 
of individuals have incentives to invest and take part in economic life; constraints on the actions of 
the elites, politicians and other powerful groups, so that these people cannot expropriate the 
incomes and investments of others in the society; and some degree of equal opportunity for broad 
segments of the society, so that they can make investments, especially in human capital, and 
participate in productive economic activities. These institutions contrast with conditions in many 
societies of the world, where the rule of law is selectively applied and property rights are 
nonexistent for the vast majority of the population.  
That institutions matter does not imply that geography is not important. If geography matters, they 
argue, we can locate the poorest places in the world, with per capita income levels less than 1/20
th 
of the United States. It will be found that almost all of them are close to the equator, in very hot 
regions with periodic torrential rains. It is true there is a correlation between geography and 
prosperity, i.e., a simple statistical association.  
To find a similar statistical association between institutions and prosperity, it is quite common, for 
example, to measure institutions in terms of the protection for entrepreneurs’ property rights – 
protection against expropriation risk. Another measure of institutions is the constraints placed on 
the executive in the post-war years, more closely corresponding to our notion of constraining elites 
and powerful groups.
24 A high score for the former means a high degree of protection against 
expropriation, and a high score for the latter means effective constraints against arbitrary actions by 
politicians and the executive. In both cases, the relationship between these measures of institutions 
and income per capita (more precisely, the logarithm of income per capita) exhibit a strong 
correlation. As was the case with geography, this statistical association does not prove causation.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, replicating the North’s exercise, to make progress in 
distinguishing between the roles of geography and institutions as fundamental causes of prosperity 
and poverty, go back in history and make use of the “experiments” it offers.  
The first natural experiment proposed by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, is a homogeneous 
country divided into two, each part with very different institutions: the case of Korea. Until the end 
of World War II, Korea was under Japanese occupation. Korean independence came on August 15, 
1945. After this date, Soviet forces entered North Korea and took over the control of these 
provinces from the Japanese. U.S. authorities, instead, supported the influential nationalist leader 
Syngman Rhee, who was in favour of separation rather than a united communist Korea. There were 
elections and a new constitution established the Republic of Korea to the south of the 38
th parallel. 
The north became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These two independent countries 
organized themselves in very different ways and adopted completely different sets of institutions. 
The North followed the model of Soviet socialism and the Chinese Revolution in abolishing private 
property of land and capital. The South, instead, maintained a system of private property and the 
government attempted to use markets and incentives in order to develop the economy. Since 
separation, the two Koreas have experienced diverging paths of economic development. Before this 
“experiment” in institutional change, north and south Korea shared the same history and cultural 
roots. Korea, in particular, exhibited an “unparalleled” degree of ethnic, cultural, geographic and 
economic homogeneity. For these reasons, the splitting on the Koreas is seen as a natural 
experiment to identify the causal influence of institutions on prosperity. Korea was split with the 
two halves organized in radically different ways, and with geography and many other potential 
determinants of economic prosperity held fixed. Thus, any differences in economic performance, 
they argue, can be attributed to differences in institutions.  
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However, the evidence from this natural experiment is not enough. For this reason, they study a 
larger scale “natural experiment” whose phenomenon is not completely new in literature
25. This is 
the colonial experiment, that is, the colonization of much of the world by Europeans. 
They argue
26 that this experience transformed the institutions in many diverse lands conquered or 
controlled by Europeans. Most importantly, they believe that Europeans imposed very different sets 
of institutions in different parts of their global empire. As a result, while geography was held 
constant, Europeans initiated large changes in economic institutions, in the social organization of 
different societies. At one extreme, Europeans set up extreme extractive institutions, which 
concentrate power in the hands of a small elite and create a high risk of expropriation for the 
majority of the population. These one are exemplified by the Belgian colonization of the Congo, 
slave plantations in the Caribbean or forced labour systems in the mines of Central America. These 
institutions introduced neither protection for the property rights of regular citizens nor constraints 
on the power of elites. This is not surprising, since these institutions were designed to facilitate 
Europeans’ extraction of resources from the colonies. At the other extreme, many Europeans went 
and settled in a number of colonies, creating settler societies, replicating, and often improving, the 
European form of institutions protecting private property. This set of institutions is essential for 
investment, incentives and economic performance. Primary examples of this mode of colonization 
include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. The settlers in these societies also 
managed to place significant constraints on elites and politicians, even if they had to fight to 
achieve this objective. Both in North America and Australia, the plans of the British crown to 
develop a more hierarchical structure were thwarted by the protests, demonstrations and migrations 
of the lower strata of European settlers. Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (AJR from now on) 
wonder what happened to economic development after colonization, if the places that were rich 
before colonization remain rich, as suggested by the geography hypothesis, or if there was a 
systematic change in economic fortunes associated with the changes in institutions. The historical 
evidence shows no evidence of the persistence suggested by the geography hypothesis. On the 
contrary, there is a sort of Reversal of Fortune in economic prosperity, as they have shown. 
Societies like the Mughlas in India, and the Aztecs and the Incas in America, that were among the 
richest civilization in 1500, are among the poorer societies of today. In contrast, countries 
occupying the territories of the less-developed civilizations in North America, New Zealand and 
Australia are now much richer than those in the lands of the Mughlas, Aztecs and Incas. 
Empirically, as proxies for prosperity before modern times, they use urbanization rates and 
population density. Only societies with a certain level of productivity in agriculture and a relatively 
developed system of transport and commerce could sustain large urban centres and a dense 
population. Their cross-country regression of log income per capita in 1995 on urbanization rates in 
1500 for a sample of 41 observations (former colonies for which data are available) shows that a 10 
percentage point lower urbanization in 1500 is associated with approximately twice as high GDP 
per capita today.  At the same time, regressing log income per capita in 1995 on log population 
density in 1500 shows that countries with higher population density in 1500 are substantially poorer 
today. AJR argue that this evidence is reversal against the most standard versions of the geography 
hypothesis discussed above: it cannot be that the climate, ecology or disease environments of the 
tropical areas condemn them to poverty today, since these areas with the same climate, ecology and 
disease environments, were richer. In particular, looking at the variation in colonization strategies, 
they see that the Reversal of Fortune is exactly what the institutions hypothesis predicts. European 
colonialism made Europeans the politically powerful group with the capability to influence 
institutions more than any indigenous group was able to, at that time. As suggested by the reasoning 
of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson explained above, we expect Europeans to have done so not 
according to the interest of the society as a whole, but in order to maximize their benefits. And this 
is exactly what the historical evidence suggests it happened. In places where Europeans did not 
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settle and thus did not care much about aggregate output or welfare, in places where there was a 
large population to be coerced and employed for cheap in mines or in agriculture, or simply taxed, 
in places where there was a lot to be extracted, they point out, Europeans pursued the strategy of 
setting up extractive institutions. In those colonies, there were no constraints on the power of the 
elites, that is the Europeans themselves and their allies, and no civil or property rights for the 
majority of the population; in fact, many of them were forced labourers or slaves. Contrasting with 
this pattern, in other colonies, Europeans settled in large numbers and developed the laws and 
institutions of the society to ensure that they themselves were protected, both in their political and 
economic lives. In these settler colonies, the institutions were therefore much more conducive to 
investment and economic growth. Moreover, Europeans were more likely to invest in the 
development of institutions of private property in areas that were sparsely settled and previously 
relatively poor. The relatively densely settled and highly urbanized colonies ended up with 
extractive institutions, while sparsely-settled and non urbanized areas received an influx of 
European migrants and developed institutions protecting property rights and constraining elites. 
European colonialism therefore led to an institutional reversal, in the sense that the richer places 
ended up with worse institutions.  
However, it is possible the Europeans did not actively introduce extractive institutions in many of 
these places. The structure of the Mughal, Aztec and Inca empires were already very hierarchical, 
non-democratic and with power concentrated in the hands of rulers. Perhaps the Europeans simply 
took over these institutions. In any case, what matters is that in densely settled and relatively-
developed places, it was in their interests to develop institutions of private property, thus leading to 
the  institutional reversal. The institutional reversal combined with the institutions hypothesis 
predicts the Reversal of Fortune: relatively rich places got worse institutions, and if these 
institutions are really important, we should see them become relatively poor over time. Empirically, 
they regress three different measures of institutions on urbanization in 1500 and log population 
density in 1500. These measures of institutions are average protection against expropriation risk 
between 1985 and 1995 from Political Risk Services, which approximates how secure property 
rights are, constraint on the executive in 1990 and in the first year of independence, from Polity III 
data set, which can be thought of as a proxy for the concentration of political power in the hands of 
ruling groups. The regressions show a negative relationship between their measures of prosperity in 
1500 and current institutions. 
 
 
3.2.2 Legal Origins  
 
Other horizons the literature offers result from the idea that countries have distinct “legal origins” 
and these matter for economic and financial outcomes. This line of research examines the costs and 
benefits of alternative legal rules, which are important due to the effects they show to have on 
economic development. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
27 study how laws protecting investors differ 
across countries, how the quality of enforcement of these laws varies, and whether these variations 
matter for corporate ownership patterns around the world. In particular, they compare empirically 
shareholder and creditor rights in 49 different countries and different legal traditions, compare the 
quality of law enforcement among the same countries and legal tradition and look at the ownership. 
In this perspective, laws in different countries are typically not written from scratch, but rather 
transplanted from a few legal families or traditions. In general, commercial laws come from two 
broad traditions: common law, which is English in origin, and civil law, which derives from Roman 
law. Within the civil tradition, there are only three major families that modern commercial laws 
originate from: French, German, and Scandinavian. The French and the German civil traditions, as 
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well as the common law tradition, have spread around the world through a combination of conquest, 
imperialism, outright borrowing, and more subtle imitation. The resulting laws reflect both the 
influence of their families and the revisions specific to individual countries. Comparative legal 
scholars agree that, even though no two nations’ laws are exactly alike, some national legal systems 
are sufficiently similar in certain critical respects to permit classification of these national legal 
systems into major families of law. On the basis of this approach, scholars identify two broad legal 
traditions: civil law and common law. The civil, or Romano-Germanic, legal tradition is the oldest, 
the most influential, and the most widely distributed around the world. It originates in Roman law, 
uses statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material, and relies 
heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate its rules. Legal scholars typically, as described 
before, identify three currently common families of laws within the civil-law tradition: French, 
German, and Scandinavian. The French Commercial Code was written under Napoleon in 1807 and 
brought by his armies to Belgium, the Netherlands, part of Poland, Italy and western regions of 
Germany. In the colonial era, France extended its legal influence to the Near East and Northern and 
sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina, Oceania, and French Caribbean islands. French legal influence has 
been significant as well in Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, some of the Swiss cantons, and Italy. The 
German Commercial Code was written in 1897 after Bismarck’s unification of Germany, and 
perhaps because it was produced several decades later, was not as widely adopted as the French 
code. It had an important influence of the legal theory and doctrine in Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan, and Korea. Taiwan’s laws came from 
China, which borrowed heavily from the German code during its modernization. The Scandinavian 
family is usually viewed as part of the civil-law tradition, although its law is less derivative of 
Roman law than the French and German families. The common-law family includes the law of 
England and those laws modelled on English law. The common law is formed by judges who have 
to resolve specific disputes. Precedents from judicial decisions shape common law. Common law 
has spread to the British colonies, including the United States, Canada, Australia, India, and many 
other countries. 
To the purpose of their study, they assemble a data set covering legal rules pertaining to the rights 
of investors and to the quality of enforcement of these rules
28. For shareholders, some of the rules 
cover voting powers, ease of participation in corporate voting, and legal protections against 
expropriation by management. For creditors, some of these rules cover the respect for security of 
the loan, the ability to catch assets in case of a loan default, and the inability of management to seek 
protection from creditors unilaterally. These rules measure the ease with which investors can 
exercise their powers against management.  
The authors look only at laws pertaining to investor protection, and specifically only at company 
and bankruptcy/reorganization laws. Company laws exist in all countries and are concerned with the 
legal relations between corporate insiders and the corporation itself and the legal relations between 
the corporation and certain outsiders, particularly creditors. Bankruptcy/reorganization laws apply 
more generally to companies but deal specifically with procedures that unfold in the case of failure 
to pay back debt. All these laws are part of the commercial codes in civil-law countries and exist as 
separate laws, mainly in the form of acts, in common-law countries.  
They begin by comparing shareholder rights from company laws. Because shareholders exercise 
their power by voting for directors and on major corporate issues, in evaluating shareholders rights, 
they include voting rights attached to shares, and rights that support the voting mechanism against 
interference by the insiders. In particular, they show that common-law countries have the relatively 
strongest, and the French-civil-law countries the weakest, protections of shareholders. Turning to 
creditor rights, they find that common-law countries protect investors the most, French-civil-law 
countries protect them the least. German-civil-law countries are in the middle, though closer to the 
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civil-law group. The one exception is the strong protections that German-civil-law countries afford 
secured creditors.  
Then, they compare the quality of law enforcement and focus on ownership. With respect to the law 
enforcement, they argue that a strong system of legal enforcement could substitute for weak rules. 
They use five different measures to address this issue: efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation by the government, and likelihood of contract repudiation by the 
government. Obviously, the quality of law enforcement differs across legal families. Scandinavian 
countries and German-civil-law countries have the highest scores of any group on the efficiency of 
the judicial system, the rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation 
by government. On all the measures of rule of law, common-law countries are behind the leaders 
but ahead of the French-civil-law countries. These results do not support the conclusion that the 
quality of law enforcement substitutes or compensates for the quality of laws. Referring to the 
ownership, they explore the hypothesis that companies in countries with poor investor protection 
have more concentrated ownership of their share. The data shown confirm that the quality of legal 
protection of shareholders helps determine ownership concentration, accounting for the higher 
concentration of ownership in the French-civil-law countries. Moreover, heavily concentrated 
ownership results from weak protection of investors in a corporate governance system. 
Historical origin of a country’s laws is also correlated with economic outcomes. 
From an empirical point of view, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
29 find higher income per 
capita is associated with better shareholder and creditor protection, more efficient debt enforcement, 
and lower government ownership of banks. Civil law is generally associated with lower shareholder 
and creditor protection, less efficient debt enforcement, and higher government ownership of banks. 
Higher income per capita is generally associated with more developed financial markets, more firms 
per capita, less ownership concentration, and a higher private-credit-to-GDP ratio. The results on 
regulation say that higher income per capita is correlated with lower entry regulation and 
government ownership of the media, but not with labour regulation or conscription. Relative to 
common law countries, French legal origin countries have more entry and labour regulation, higher 
state ownership of the media, and heavier reliance on conscription. Results on judicial institutions 
show higher income per capita is associated with less legal formalism but not with longer judicial 
tenure or the acceptance of case law. Compared to common law countries, civil law countries have 
more legal formalism, lower judicial tenure, and lower constitutional acceptance of case law. 
Compared to French civil law, common law is associated with better investor protection, which in 
turn is associated with improved financial development, better access to finance, and higher 
ownership dispersion; lighter government ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated 
with less corruption, better functioning labour markets, and smaller unofficial economies; and less 
formalized and more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with more secure 
property rights and better contract enforcement. 
All this evidence shows the pervasiveness of the economic consequences of legal origins.  
Legal origins, they argue, influence legal rules and regulations, which in turn have substantial 
impact on important economic outcomes (from financial development, to unemployment, to 
investment and entry, to the size of unofficial economy, to international trade). And from this, they 
outline the Legal Origin Theory, whose basic ingredients are three. First, by the eighteenth or 
nineteenth centuries England and Continental Europe, particularly France, have developed very 
different styles of social control of business, and institutions supporting these styles. Second, these 
styles of social control were transplanted by the origin countries to most of the world, rather than 
written from scratch. Third, these styles have proved persistent in addressing social problems.  
Legal Origins Theory raises the obvious question of how the influence of legal origins has persisted 
over the decades or even centuries. The key point is that transplantation involves not just specific 
legal rules but also legal institutions, human capital of the participants in the legal system, and the 
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strategy of the law for dealing with new problems. Successive generations of judges, lawyers, and 
politicians all learn the same broad ideas of how the law and the state should work. The legal 
system supplies the fundamental tools for addressing social concerns and it is that system, with its 
codes, distinctive institutions, modes of thought and even ideologies, that is very slow to change. 
The fact that legal system is slow to change does not mean that specific legal rules and regulations 
never change. Moreover, this theory does not say that common law always works better for the 
economy. As Glaeser and Shleifer show, regulation and state control may be efficient responses to 
disorder, where common-law solutions fail to sustain markets. Glaeser and Shleifer
30 (2003), 
interpret the early twentieth century rise of the regulatory state in the United States as an efficient 
response to the subversion of the justice system by large corporation. They wonder why, between 
1887 and 1917, in the United States, reformers eroded the nineteenth-century belief that private 
litigation was the sole appropriate response to social wrongs. To this end, they develop a theory of 
law enforcement in which private litigation, government regulation, a combination of the two, and 
doing nothing are considered as alternative institutional arrangements to secure property rights. In 
their theory, whatever law enforcement strategy the society chooses, private individuals will seek to 
subvert its workings to benefit themselves. The efficiency of alternative institutional arrangements 
depends in part on their vulnerability to such subversion. In this way, they interpret the early 
twentieth century rise of the regulatory state in the United States as an efficient response to the 
subversion of the justice system by large corporations. The principal message of their analysis is the 
tight relationship between the “law and order” already prevailing in a society, and the optimality of 
alternative law enforcement schemes. To understand the rise of regulation in the United States at the 
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, we have to follow their 
reasoning. The scale of economic activity rose dramatically over the nineteenth century. During the 
industrial revolution, firms grew sharply in size. The social costs of harm grew roughly 
proportionately, but the costs of subverting justice did not. As a result, a legal system that may have 
operated well during the agrarian period failed when faced with entities that had huge incentives to 
subvert it both legally and illegally. Because higher levels of economic activity lead to subversion 
of both strict liability and negligence, adding regulation was the efficient response. The rise of the 
regulatory state may have been an efficient response to changing conditions. 
To conclude, they claim that no country exhibits a system of social control that is an ideal type; all 
countries mix the two approaches. Common law countries are quite capable of civil law solutions, 
and vice versa. Nonetheless, the empirical prediction of the Legal Origin Theory is that the 
differences between legal origins are deep enough that we observe them expressed in the different 
strategies of social control of economic life even after centuries of legal and regulatory evolution. 
Perhaps because the legal system is such a difficult to change element of social order, legal origins 




3.2.3 Human Capital or Institutions?   
 
The role of education has been largely emphasized among the determinants of long-term economic 
growth.  
For example, in Human Capital and Growth (2001), Barro observes that given the level of GDP, a 
higher initial stock of human capital signifies a higher ratio of human to physical capital and this 
higher ratio tends to generate higher growth through al least two channels. First, more human 
capital facilitates the absorption of superior technologies from leading countries. Second, human 
capital tends to be more difficult to adjust than physical capital. Therefore, a country that starts with 
a high ratio of human to physical capital tends to grow rapidly by adjusting upward the quantity of 
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physical capital. Barro shows that the quality and quantity of schooling both matter for growth but 
that quality is much more important. Also Lucas
31, in his seminal paper on economic development 
(1988), emphasizes the accumulation of human capital as a main engine of growth; thus, according 
to the analysis in that paper, cross-country differences in growth rates across countries would be 
primarily attributable to differences in rates of accumulation of human capital. 
An alternative approach was pioneered by Nelson and Phelps
32 (1966) and many years later 
deepened and expanded by Aghion. This emphasizes the combined effect of the stock of human 
capital and of the innovation process in generating long-run growth and fostering convergence. In 
this alternative approach, differences in growth rates across countries would be mainly attributable 
to differences in stocks of human capital, as those condition countries’ ability to innovate or to 
adapt to new technologies and thereby catch up with the world technological frontier. The history of 
cross-country income differences exhibits mixed patterns of convergence and divergence. The most 
striking pattern, Aghion (2005) observes, over the long run is the “great divergence”, the dramatic 
widening of the distribution that has taken place since the early nineteenth century. As we have 
already said, the pattern of convergence is not universal: the gap between the leading countries as a 
whole and the very poorest countries as a whole has continued to widen. Thus, the history of 
income differences since the mid twentieth century has been one of “club-convergence” (Aghion); 
that is, all rich and most middle income countries seem to belong to one group, or “convergence 
club”, with the same long-run growth rate, whereas all other countries seem to have diverse long-
run growth rates, all strictly less than that of the convergence club. The basic model developed by 
Aghion suggests that long-run growth would be best enhanced by a combination of good property 
right protection (to protect the rents of innovators against imitation), a good education system, in 
order to increase the efficiency of R&D activities, and a stable macroeconomy to reduce interest 
rates. The discussion of convergence club suggests that the same policies or institutions would also 
increase a country’s ability to join the convergence club. However, in his essay Econonomic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that relatively backward 
economies could more rapidly catch up with more advanced countries by introducing “appropriate 
institutions” that are growth-enhancing at an early stage of development but may cease to be so at a 
later stage. Aghion argues that the Gerschenkron’s idea of “appropriate institutions” can be easily 
embedded in a growth framework. Innovation activities require initiative, risk taking, the selection 
of good projects and talents, and all this, he claims, calls for more market-based and flexible 
institutions, for a higher reliance on market finance, higher competition and trade liberalization, 
more flexible labour markets and so forth. In particular, it follows from the linear relationship 
between the country’s distance to frontier at time t and at time t-1, that the growth-maximizing 
institutions will evolve as a country moves toward the world technological frontier. Far below the 
frontier, a country will grow faster if it adopts the so called investment-based institutions or 
policies, whereas closer to the frontier growth will be maximized if the country switches to 
innovation-based institutions or policies.  
The literature we have seen so far has reached closed to an intellectual consensus that the 
institutions, in general, cause economic growth. The reverse idea, namely that growth in income and 
human capital causes institutional improvement, is associated with the work of Lipset, who believes 
that educated people are more likely to resolve their differences through negotiation and voting than 
through violent disputes. According to this view, countries differ in their stocks of human and social 
capital, and institutional outcomes depend to a large extent on these endowments. Human capital 
leads to more benign politics, less violence, and more political stability. Lipset’s hypothesis, that 
growth leads to better political institutions, has received considerable support in the work of 
Przeworski
33. 
                                                 
31 “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”  
32 “Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, and Economic Growth” 
33 Przeworski claims that institutions are not a deeper cause than the supply of factors or technology: institutions may 
determine the supply of factors and their use, but these factors affect growth and future wealth, which affect the                   
  28
The two views of economic and political development share some important similarities. They both 
emphasize the need for secure property rights to support investment in human and physical capital, 
and they both see such security as a public policy choice. Nevertheless, the institutional view sees 
checks on government as the mechanisms for securing property rights, the “human capital” view 
emphasizes the need for human and physical capital accumulation to start the process. 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
34 (2004) revisit these two broad approaches to 
development in an effort to assess each one’s empirical validity. 
They start with the standard OLS growth regressions using different measures of institutions to 
assess the effect of institutions on economic growth. They use averages of the assessments of 
institutional quality over a period of time. The dependent variable is the growth of per capita 
income between 1960 and 2000, and the independent variables are initial income per capita, initial 
education, the share of a country’s population in temperate zones, as well as eight institutional 
variables (executive constraints, expropriation risk, autocracy, government effectiveness, judicial 
independence, constitutional review, plurality, proportional representation) entering at one time. 
The evidence shows a correlation between economic growth over a period and the average 
assessments of institutional quality over that period, including constraints on the executive, risk of 
expropriation, government effectiveness, and autocracy. In contrast, there is no relationship 
between growth and constitutional measures of institutions, such as judicial independence, 
constitutional review, plurality, and proportional representation. Then, they present a series of 
growth regressions in which the independent variable is the executive constraints at the beginning 
of the period. Starting in 1960, the regressions are run decade by decade, using initial period per 
capita income, initial period education, and initial period constraints on the executive as 
independent variables, and they show that initial executive constraints have no predictive power for 
subsequent economic growth outside the 1980s, whereas initial human capital is a predictor. 
From this evidence, they conclude that the claim “institutions cause economic growth”, as opposed 
to growth improving institutions, is “non-existent”. The objective measures of institutions, those 
that describe the constitutional rules that limit the power of the sovereign, have no predictive power 
for the growth of per capita income. 
Then, they consider human capital and political institutions in the sample of poor countries. To this 
end, they divide their sample of countries into those with low human capital, intermediate human 
capital, and high human capital. They divide the sample into four types of political regimes using 
the average Polity IV democracy score: autocracies (countries with the average score under 2), 
stable democracies (countries with the average score of 10), and two intermediate groups: imperfect 
autocracies (the average score between 2 and 7) and imperfect democracies (the average score 
between 7 and 10). They find that nearly all highly educated countries are stable democracies, and 
nearly all-stable democracies are highly educated. In contrast, almost all dictatorships are poorly 
educated. The lowest education countries are never stable democracies; the highest education 
countries are generally stable, but sometimes imperfect, democracies. They also show that during 
1960-2000, countries with high human capital in 1960 have grown faster than low human capital 
ones; stable democracies have grown faster than imperfect democracies, and much faster than 
dictatorships, on average. Finally, they look at changes in political institutions (executive 
constraints, autocracy, democracy) over 5-year intervals as a function of country fixed effects, 
initial schooling, initial level of economic development, and initial levels of these political 
institutions themselves. Initial levels of schooling and initial levels of these political institutions are 
a strong predictor of improving institutional outcomes over the next 5 years. 
Eicher,  Garcia-Penalosa and Tekson
35  (2006) providing an exploration of the mechanisms by 
which institutions affect output, find that institutions and human capital are substitutes. Institutions 
                                                                                                                                                                  
evolution of institutions. Wealth , its distribution and the institutions that allocate factors and distribute incomes are 
mutually interdependent and evolve together. 
34 “Do institutions Cause Growth?” 
35 “How Do Institutions Lead Some Countries to Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?”                   
  29
alone do not produce output. Hence, their effect must be indirect, operating through their impact on 
either factor accumulation or productivity. They combine the approach of Hall and Jones (1999), 
with that of Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992), which emphasizes the importance of investment in 
human and physical capital, to explain cross-country per capita income levels. Specifically, they 
examine whether specifications in which institutions are the sole determinant of output levels can be 
improved upon by allowing for the effect of factor inputs. Their hypothesis is that the main 
contribution of institutional quality to development is through its impact on the accumulation of 
human and physical capital. 
They start regressing output on both institutions (measured and instrumented as done by Hall and 
Jones) and factor inputs. They find that the inclusion of a measure of institutions into the Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil specification yields a significant coefficient on institutions and that augmenting 
Hall and Jones’s specification with physical factors of production reduces the effect of institutions 
on output. To understand how much of the variation in output is accounted for by the direct impact 
of institutions, as opposed to the indirect effect of institutions that works through factor inputs, they 
regress, respectively, output on factor inputs, institutions and the level of technology, and inputs on 
institutions. Physical and human capital react rather differently to improvements in institutional 
quality. A reason for this could be that the elasticities of output with respect to factor endowments, 
and hence factor returns, depend on a country’s institutional quality. That is, given the level of 
technology, the effect of a given stock of (physical or human) capital on output depends on the 
quality of a country’s institutions.  
Finally, they study the relationship between institutions and factors of production estimating an 
equation where the dependent variable is output per worker and the independent variables are 
institutions, factor inputs and the interaction terms between institutions and human and physical 
capital. This regression allows them to conclude that better institutions seem to increase the 
productivity of physical capital, but reduce that of human capital. Institutions increase the elasticity 
of output with respect to physical capital and labour, and reduce the elasticity with respect to human 
capital. Human capital and institutions by themselves have a positive impact; however, institutions 
matter more for growth in low human capital countries. The reverse way of thinking about this 




4.  Economic Policy and Institutions 
 
 
4.1 Growth Policies 
 
The standard policy reforms, included in the Washington Consensus (table 1), have the potential to 
promote growth. What should be understood is that the impact of these reforms is dependent on 
circumstances. Policies that work in some places may have weak, unintended, or negative effects in 
others. 
Rodrik in One Economics, Many Recipes (2007) shows how it is possible to develop a unified 
framework for analyzing and formulating growth strategies that is both operational and based on 
solid economic reasoning. For this objective, the step is to develop a better understanding of how 
the binding constraints on economic activity differ from setting to setting. This understanding can 
be used to derive policy priorities. 
 Economic growth depends on the returns to accumulation, on their private appropriability, and on 
the cost of financing accumulation. The first stage of the diagnostic analysis, as it is presented by 
Rodrik, aims at uncovering which of these three factors poses the greatest impediment to higher 
growth. In some economies, the “constraint” may lie in low returns, in other may be poor                   
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appropriability, and in others too high cost of finance. The next stage of the diagnostic analysis is to 
discover the specific distortions that lie behind the most severe of these constraints. If  
the problem seems to be poor appropriability, it might be due to high taxes, corruption, or macro 
instability. If, instead, the problem is with the high cost of finance, it might be due to fiscal deficits 
or poor intermediation. A process of growth diagnostics consists of reviewing and analyzing these 
factors to ascertain which of these factors is the most binding constraint on growth. All factors are 
likely to matter for growth and welfare. The challenge is to identify the one that provides the largest 
positive direct effect, so that even after taking into account second-best interactions and indirect 
effects, the net impact of a policy change is beneficial. 
 
Table 4 The Washington Consensus Rules 
 
Original Washington Consensus  “Augmented” Washington Consensus 
(addition to the original 10 items) 
Fiscal Discipline  Corporate governance 
Reorientation of public expenditures  Anticorruption 
Tax Reform  Flexible labour markets 
Interest Rate Liberalization  Adherence to WTO disciplines 
Unified and competitive exchange rates  Adherence to international financial codes and 
standards 
Trade liberalization  Prudent capital-account opening 
Openness to direct foreign investment  Nonintermediate exchange rate regimes 
Privatization  Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
Deregulation  Social safety nets 
Secure property rights  Targeted poverty reduction 
 
(Source: Dani Rodrik 2007) 
 
 
Actually, once the constraint and the key problems have been identified, they are these one that 
deserve the most attention from policymakers and, for this reason, it is necessary to think about the 
appropriate policy response. The point in this step is to focus on the market failures and distortions 
associated with the constraint discovered previously. The response must be targeted as closely as 
possible on the source of the distortion. Hence, if credit constraints are the main ones, and the 
problem is the result of lack of competition and large bank spreads, the appropriate response is to 
reduce impediments to competition in the banking sector. If economic activity is held back because 
of high taxes, the solution is to lower them, and so on. Thus, this step involves policy design, where 
the objective is to remove the identified constraints with targeted policies that are cognizant of the 
local realities. Finally, the third step requires the institutionalisation of the diagnostic and policy 
design activities, with the goals of strengthening the institutional infrastructure of the economy. The 
most frequent cause for the collapse in growth is the inability to deal with the consequences of 
external shocks. Resilience against such shocks requires strengthening the rule of law, solidifying 
democratic institutions (if they exist), and erecting social safety nets. When such institutions are in 
place, the macroeconomic and other adjustments, needed to deal with adverse shocks, can be 
undertaken relatively smoothly. When they are not, the result is distributive conflict and economic 
collapse. 
It is easier, Rodrik argues, to list the functions that good institutions perform than it is to describe 
the shape they should take. Desirable institutions are seen as those providing security of property 
rights, enforce contracts, stimulate entrepreneurship, foster integration in the world economy, 
maintain macroeconomic stability, manage risk-taking by financial intermediaries, supply social                   
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insurance and safety nets, and enhance voice and accountability. But concretely, each one of these 
ends can be achieved in a large number of different ways. Furthermore, developing nations are 
different from advanced countries in that they face both greater challenges and more constraints. 
One of the most important challenge and constraint is inequality. Easterly
36 (2007) has found 
evidence that supports the hypothesis that high structural inequality is a large and statistically 
significant hindrance to develop the mechanisms by which economic development is achieved. 
The type of institutional reform promoted by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, or the World Trade Organizations is heavily biased toward a best-
practice model. It presumes it is possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional 
arrangements ex ante, and views convergence toward those arrangements as inherently desiderable. 
This approach is grounded in a first best mindset, which presumes the primary role of institutional 
arrangements is to minimize transaction costs in the immediately relevant domain, without paying 
attention to potential interactions with institutional features elsewhere in the system. Dealing with 
the institutional landscape in developing economies requires a second best mindset (Second Best 
Institutions, Rodrik, 2008).  Rodrik elaborates on this point using illustrations from four areas: 
contract enforcement, entrepreneurship, trade openness, and macroeconomic stability. For the first 
area, thinking in these second best terms suggests avenues of reform that may have been easily 
overlooked. Perhaps it is more effective to enhance relational contracting than to invest in first-class 
legal institutions. Perhaps early efforts at reforming formal contract enforcement institutions should 
focus on specific categories of firms that do not have access to relational contracting instead of 
targeting all firms across the board. For the second, a single minded effort to reduce entry 
regulations may not only fail to produce the intended effects, it may also backfire when the binding 
constraint is expected returns that are too small rather than inadequate competition. Appropriate 
reform strategy requires having a good fix on the binding constraint. For the third, a particular 
economic objective can be achieved through a number of different institutional designs, and 
sometimes it is worth doing things in an “unorthodox” way if this will serve to relax other 
constraints elsewhere in the system. For the last, the lesson is that institutional rigidity pays off 
when lack of credibility and time inconsistency are the main problems of the day, but that it can 
eventually become a drag on growth. No single set of best practices will serve the needs of all 
countries at all times. The feature stressed here is that real world reformers operate in a second best 
environment of their own, which means they need to keep an eye on how proposed solutions affect 
multiple distortions. There will be multiple ways of removing a constraint, some of which may be 
politically much more feasible than others. Also, the nature of the binding constraint will change 
over time, requiring a change in focus. Best practice institutions are noncontextual and do not take 
into account these complications. Insofar as they narrow rather than expand the “menu” of 
institutional choices available to reformers, they serve the cause badly.  
 
 
4.2 Functional Institutions 
 
Economies, formed by markets, require institutions because they are not self-creating, self-
regulating, or self-stabilizing. Rodrik
37 considers and analyzes five types of functional institutions, 
in the sense of supporting a healthy, sustainable, market based system. These functional institutions 
are: property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, institutions 
for social insurance, and institutions of conflict management. 
 
                                                 
36 “Inequality does cause underdevelopment: Insights from a new instrument” 
37 “One Economics, Many Recipes”, 2007.                   
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•  Property rights 
The establishment of secure and stable property rights has been a key element in the rise of 
the West and the onset of modern economic growth. It stands to reason that entrepreneurs do 
not have the incentive to accumulate and innovate unless they have adequate control over 
the return to the assets that are thereby produced or improved. The key word is “control” 
rather than “ownership”: formal property rights do not count for much if they do not confer 
control rights. Each society decides for itself the scope of allowable property rights and the 
acceptable restrictions on their exercise. Intellectual property rights are protected in the most 
advanced societies, but not in many developing countries. On the other hand, legislation 
restricts the ability of households and enterprises in the rich countries to do as they please 
with their “property” to a much greater extent than is the case in developing countries. All 
societies recognize that private property rights can be controlled if doing so serves a greater 
public purpose. It is the definition of what constitutes “greater public purpose” that varies. 
•  Regulatory Institutions 
Markets fail when participants engage in fraudulent or anticompetitive behaviour. They fail 
when transaction costs prevent the internalizing of technological and other nonpecuniary 
externalities and when incomplete information results in moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Economists recognize these failures and have developed the analytical tools required to 
think systematically about their consequences and possible remedies. Theories of the second 
best, imperfect competition, agency, and many others offer an almost embarrassing choice 
of regulatory instruments to counter market failures. Theories of political economy and 
public choice offer cautions against unqualified reliance on these instruments. 
In practice, every successful market economy is overseen by a set of regulatory institutions, 
regulating conduct in goods, services, labour, assets, and financial markets. In fact, the freer 
are the markets, the greater is the burden on the regulatory institutions. It is not a 
coincidence, Rodrik states, that the United States have the world’s freest markets as well its 
toughest antitrust enforcement. The lesson that market freedom requires regulatory vigilance 
has been driven home by the experience in East Asia during the Asian financial crisis. In 
South Korea and Thailand, as in so many other developing countries, financial liberalization 
and capital account opening led to financial crises precisely because of inadequate 
prudential regulation and supervision. It is important to recognize that regulatory institutions 
may need to extend beyond the standard list covering antitrust, financial supervision, 
securities regulation, and a few others. This is true especially in developing countries, where 
market failures may be more pervasive and the requisite market regulations more extensive. 
The experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s are interpreted by 
Rodrik in that light. The extensive subsidization and government coordination of private 
investment in these two economies played a crucial role in setting the stage for self-
sustaining growth. It is clear that many other countries have tried and failed to replicate 
these institutional arrangements. However, it has to be stressed that desiderable institutional 
arrangements vary, not only across countries, but within countries over time. 
•  Institutions for Macroeconomic Stabilization 
Since Keynes, we have come to a better understanding of the reality that capitalist 
economies are not necessarily self-stabilizing. Keynes and his followers worried about 
shortfalls in aggregate demand and the resulting unemployment. More recent views of 
macroeconomic instability stress the inherent instability of financial markets and its 
transmission to the real economy. All advanced economies have come to acquire fiscal and 
monetary institutions that perform stabilizing functions, having learned the hard way about 
the consequences of not having them. Probably most important among these institutions is a 
lender of last resort – typically the central bank –, which guards against self-fulfilling 
banking crises.                   
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There is a strong current within macroeconomic thought, represented in its theoretically 
most sophisticated version by the real business cycles (RBC) approach that disputes the 
possibility of effectiveness of stabilizing the macroeconomy through monetary and fiscal 
policies. There is also a sense in policy circles that fiscal and monetary institutions have 
added to macroeconomic instability, rather than reduced it, by following procyclical rather 
than anticyclical policies. These developments have spurred the trend toward central bank 
independence, and helped open a new debate on designing more robust financial institutions. 
Some countries have given up on a domestic lender of last resort function by making their 
central banks function like a currency board. The Argentine calculation was that having a 
central bank that can occasionally stabilize the economy is not worth running the risk that 
the central bank will mostly destabilize it. Perhaps Argentine history gives plenty of reason 
to think that this is not a bad bet. But what may work for Argentina may not work for others, 
like Mexico, Brazil, Turkey or Indonesia. And even in Argentina, the currency board system 
worked for a while. The debate over currency boards and dollarization illustrates the 
obvious, but occasionally neglected fact that the institutions needed by a country are not 
independent of that country’s history. 
•  Institutions for Social Insurance and Social Cohesion for Institutions 
A modern market economy is one where change is constant and the individual-specific 
(idiosyncratic) risk to incomes and employment is pervasive. Modern economic growth 
entails a transition from a static economy to a dynamic one, where the tasks that workers 
perform are in constant evolution, and movement up and down in the income scale is 
frequent. One of the liberating effects of a dynamic market economy is that it frees 
individuals from their traditional entanglements (like the church, the village hierarchy). The 
flip side is that it uproots them from traditional support systems and risk sharing institutions. 
And as a consequence, the social arrangements for equalizing the distribution of resources in 
traditional societies lose much of their social insurance functions. And the risks that have to 
be insured against become much less manageable in the traditional manner as markets 
spread. 
The expansion of publicly provided social insurance programs during the twentieth century 
is one of the most remarkable features of the evolution of advanced market economies. In 
the United States, it was the Great Depression that paved the way for the major institutional 
innovations in this area: Social Security, unemployment compensation, public works, public 
ownership, deposit insurance, and legislation favouring unions. Prior to the Great 
Depression, the middle classes were generally able to self-insure or buy insurance from 
private intermediaries. As these private forms of insurance collapsed, the middle classes 
threw their considerable political weight behind the extension of social insurance and the 
creation of what would later be called the welfare state. In Europe, the roots of the welfare 
state reached in some cases to the tail end of the nineteenth century. But the expansion of 
social insurance programs, particularly in the smaller economies most open to foreign trade, 
was a post World War II phenomenon.  
Social insurance institutions not always take the form of transfer programs paid out of fiscal 
resources. The East Asian model, represented well by Japan, is one where social insurance is 
provided through a combination of enterprise practices (such as lifetime employment), 
sheltered and regulated sectors, and an incremental approach to liberalization and external 
opening. Certain aspects of Japanese society that seem inefficient to outside observers can 
be viewed as substitutes for the transfer programs that would otherwise have to be provided 
(as they are in most Europeans nations) by a welfare state. At the same time, the existing 
welfare states in Western Europe and the United States engender a number of economic and 
social costs (fiscal outlays, long-term unemployment), which have become increasingly 
apparent. Partly because of that, developing countries, such as those in Latin America that 
adopted the market-oriented model following the debt crisis of the 1980s, have not paid                   
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sufficient attention to creating institutions of social insurance. The result has been economic 
insecurity and a violent reaction against the reforms. How these countries will maintain 
social cohesion in the face of large inequalities and volatile outcomes, both of which are 
being aggravated by the growing reliance on market forces, is a question without an obvious 
answer. But if Latin America and the other developing regions are to open a different path in 
social insurance than that followed by Europe or North America, they will have to develop 
their own vision to bridge the tension between market forces and the yearning for economic 
security.   
Social insurance legitimises a market economy by rendering it compatible with social 
stability and social cohesion. In turn, the degree of social cohesion, as shown by another 
branch of the literature, shapes the social constraints, which are one of the primary reasons 
why even good politicians in countries all over the world, but especially in low income 
countries, often enact bad policies. Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock
38 (2006) try to examine 
the strength and direction of the relationship between social structures, political institutions, 
and economic policies. They use a concept of social cohesion to make the general point that 
the extent to which people work together when crisis strikes or opportunity knocks is a key 
factor shaping economic performance. They define social cohesion as the nature and extent 
of social and economic divisions within society. These divisions represent vectors around 
which politically societal cleavages can develop. Socially cohesive societies are not 
necessarily demographically homogenous, but rather ones that have fewer potential or actual 
leverage points for individuals, groups, or events to expose and exacerbate social fault lines, 
and ones that find ways to harness the potential residing in their societal diversity. In 
literature, various attempts to measure social cohesion can be found. Some are direct 
measures, some indirect. For the first type, the most common are Memberships Rates of 
Organizations and Civic Participation and  Measure of Trust; for the second, these are: 
Income Distribution Measures and Ethnic Heterogeneity. 
Looking at the global recession in 1974-1994, it is instructive to examine some of the 
differences between those countries that overcame the storm and those that did not. In a 
study of a large sample of developing countries, for instance, Rodrik
39 (1999) finds evidence 
that weak public institutions and (ethnically and economically) divided societies responded 
worse to the shock than did those with high-quality institutions and united societies.  
But by what mechanisms does social cohesion affect growth? Empirically, Easterly, Ritzen 
and Woolcock show that social cohesion determines the quality of institutions, which in turn 
has important impacts on growth. They work in order to take into account the endogeneity 
of institutions: one equation has a measure of “institutions” as dependent variable and the 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the middle-class share (measures of social cohesion) as 
independent variables, the other one has the output per capita growth rate as dependent 
variable and a proxy for “institutions” as independent variable. The measures of institutions 
adopted are voice and accountability, quality of bureaucracy, civil liberties, government 
effectiveness, freedom from graft, law and order tradition, freedom from political instability 
and violence, political rights, freedom from regulatory burden, rule of law, and trust. These 
measures are all used and therefore there are as many regressions as the number of 
institutional measures considered. 
The indicators of social cohesion make natural instruments that allow identifying a causal 
link from good institutions to growth. Considering institutions, they find that all the proxies 
of institutional quality are positively associated with growth and all the institutional 
measures (“trust” works less well) are related to both of the measures of cohesion. Thus, 
more social cohesion leads to better institutions and better institutions in turn lead to higher 
growth. 
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39 “Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflicts, and growth collapse”                   
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While social cohesion is partly shaped by national leaders, social cohesion also depends on 
some exogenous historical accidents. A nation-state that has developed a common language 
among its citizens is more cohesive than one that is linguistically fragmented. This is not to 
say that linguistic homogeneity is bad or good. Linguistic homogeneity may simply be an 
indicator of how much a group of nationals have developed a common identity over the 
decades or centuries that national identify forms. Where such a common identity is lacking, 
opportunistic politicians can and do exploit ethnic differences to build up a power base. This 
should not be interpreted in the sense that nations where there are large cleavages of class 
and language are condemned to poor institutions and low growth. This reasoning only says 
that on average lack of social cohesion has been exploited by politicians to undermine 
institutions, which in turn has resulted in low growth. But politicians can choose to build a 
good “environment”, unify fractionalized peoples, and defeat the average tendency to divide 
and rule. One potentially important lever for enhancing social cohesion, they claim, is 
education. Education helps provide public knowledge about the very idea of social contrasts 
among individuals and between individuals and the state. Schools help providing the context 
within which students learn the appropriate behaviour for upholding social contracts, by 
providing students with a range of experiences in which they learn how to negotiate with 
people, problems, and opportunities they might not otherwise encounter. Education helps 
providing an understanding of the expected consequences of breaking social contracts. 
•  Institutions of Conflict Management 
Societies differ in many aspects. Some are made up of an ethnically and linguistically 
homogeneous population marked by a relatively egalitarian distribution of resources. Others 
are characterized by deep cleavages along ethnic or income lines. These divisions, when not 
bridged adequately, can hamper social cooperation and prevent the undertaking of mutually 
beneficial projects. Social conflict is harmful both because it diverts resources from 
economically productive activities and because it discourages such activities by the 
uncertainty it generates. 
These circumstances can be thought of as instances of a failure by social factions to 
coordinate on outcomes that would be of mutual benefit. Healthy societies have a range of 
institutions that make such colossal coordination failures less likely. The rule of law, a high 
quality judiciary, representative political institutions, free elections, independent trade 
unions, social partnership, institutionalized representation of minority groups, and social 
insurance are examples of such institutions. 
These arrangements, Rodrik argues, function as institutions of conflict management because 
they warn the potential winners of social conflict that their gains will be limited, and assure 
the losers that they will not be expropriated. They tend to increase the incentives for social 
groups to cooperate by reducing the payoff to socially uncooperative strategies. 
 
The idea that a specific type of institution is the only type that is compatible with a well functioning 
market economy requires scepticism. To this regard, it is necessary to understand how a developing 
society acquires a market-based economy with its set of functional institutions. Rodrik
40 (2007) 
suggests to think of the acquisition or building of a market-based economy as the adoption of a new 
technology that allows society to transform its primary endowments (land, raw labour, natural 
resources) into a larger bundle of outputs. Let this new technology be called “market economy”, 
where the term encompasses all of the institutional complements discussed previously. 
To realize what kind of a technology is a market economy, two possibilities should be considered. 
One possibility is that the new technology is a general purpose one, that it is codified and readily 
available on world markets. In this case, it can be adopted by simply importing a programme 
(blueprint) from the more advanced economies. The transition to a market economy, in this vision, 
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as Rodrik explains, consists of getting a “manual” how to build a market economy with the 
directions to remove price distortions, privatise enterprises, harden budget constraints, and so on. 
A different possibility is that the requisite technology is highly specific to local conditions and it 
contains a high degree of tacitness. Specificity implies that the institutional asset available in the 
advanced countries may be inappropriate to the needs of the society in question and tacitness that 
much of the knowledge that is required is in fact not written down, leaving the blueprints highly 
incomplete. For these reasons, imported blueprints are useless and institutions need to be developed 
locally, relying on local knowledge, experience and experimentation. 
These two scenarios are only theoretical: neither the blueprint nor the local-knowledge perspective 
captures the whole story. Even under the best possible circumstances, an imported programme 
requires domestic expertise for successful implementation. But this dichotomy clarifies some key 
issues in institution building and sheds light on important debates about institutional development. 
As example, Rodrik considers the debate on Chinese gradualism. One perspective claims Chinese 
particularism by arguing that the successes of the economy are not due to any special aspects of the 
Chinese transition to a market economy, but instead are due to a convergence of Chinese 
institutions to those in nonsocialist economies. In this view, the faster the convergence, the better 
the outcomes. The policy indication that follows is that China should focus not on institutional 
experimentation but on harmonizing its institutions with those abroad. The other perspective is that 
the peculiarities of the Chinese model represent solutions to particular political or informational 
problems for which the blueprint-style doesn’t exist. Hence, an alteration in the planned economy 
that improves incentives at the margin, enhances efficiency in resource allocation, and leaves none 
of the plan beneficiaries worse off. In this view, the Chinese-style decentralization is interpreted as 
allowing the development of superior institutions of coordination: when economic activity requires 
products with matched attributes, local experimentation is a more effective way of processing and 
using local knowledge. 
As Rodrik suggests, there are “dangers” also with experimentalism. First of all, one needs to 
distinguish “self conscious experimentalism” from delay and gradualism designed to serve 
privileged interests. The two-steps-forward, one-step-backward style that prevails in much of the 
former Soviet Union and sub Saharan Africa is driven not so much by a desire to build better 
institutions as by aversion to reform. This has to be distinguished from a programmatic effort to 
acquire and process local- knowledge to better serve local needs. Second, it is obviously costly, in 
terms of time and resources, to build institutions from scratch when imported programmes can serve 
just as well. Costs in this context have to be evaluated carefully, since experimentalism can have 
opportunity costs as well, insofar as it forecloses certain paths of future institutional development. 
Much of the legislation establishing a SEC agency for securities markets, for example, can be 
borrowed from those countries that have already learned how to regulate these markets the hard 
way. The same goes perhaps for an antitrust agency, a financial supervisory agency, a central bank, 
and many other governmental functions. One can always learn from the institutional arrangements 
prevailing elsewhere, even if they are inappropriate or cannot be transplanted. 
The difficult questions, and the trade-offs between the blueprint and the experimentalist approaches, 
arise when the attainable objectives are not so clear. Local knowledge matters greatly in answering 
these questions. Blueprints, best practices, international codes and standards, harmonization can do 
the trick for some “technical” issues. But large-scale institutional development by and large requires 
a process of discovery about local needs and capabilities. 
 
 
4.3 Participatory Political Institutions 
 
The blueprint approach is largely top-down and relies on expertise on the part of technocrats and 
foreign advisors. The local-knowledge approach is, by contrast, bottom-up and relies on                   
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mechanisms for eliciting and aggregating local information
41. In principle, these mechanisms can be 
as diverse as the institutions that they help create. But the most reliable forms of such mechanisms, 
Rodrik thinks, are participatory political institutions, which can be thought as metainstitutions that 
aggregate local knowledge and thereby help build better institutions. 
It is certainly true that nondemocratic forms of government have often succeeded admirably in the 
task of institution building using alternative devices. The examples of South Korea, with its 
bureaucratic autonomy, and China, with its decentralization and experimentalism, come to mind. 
Yet the cross-national evidence indicates that these are the exceptions rather than the rule. Nothing 
prevents authoritarian regimes from using local knowledge; the trouble is that nothing compels 
them to do so. 
Rodrik exploits the case of Mauritius to illustrate how participatory democracy helps build better 
institutions that lay the foundation for sustainable economic growth. The initial conditions in 
Mauritius were inauspicious from a number of standpoints. The island was a monocrop economy in 
the early 1960s and faced a population explosion. Mauritius is also an ethnically and linguistically 
divided society, and its independence in 1968 was preceded by a series of riots between Muslims 
and Creoles. Mauritius’s superior economic performance has been built on a peculiar combination 
of orthodox and heterodox strategies. To an important extent, the economy’s success was based on 
the creation of an export-processing zone (EPZ) operating under free-trade principles, which 
enabled an export boom in garments to European markets and an accompanying investment boom 
at home. The island’s economy has combined the export-processing zone with a domestic sector 
that was highly protected until the mid-1980s. Mauritius has followed a two-track strategy similar 
to that of China. This economic strategy was in turn supported by social and political arrangements 
that encouraged participation, representation, and coalition building. Rather than discouraging 
social organization, governments have encouraged it. The circumstances under which the Mauritian 
export-processing zone was set up in 1970 are instructive, and highlight the manner in which 
participatory political systems help design creative strategies for building locally adapted 
institutions. Given the small size of the home market, it was evident that Mauritius would benefit 
                                                 
41Two contrasting worldviews coexist in institutional economics. These views are labelled as “top down” versus “bottom up”. The top 
down view of institutions sees them as determined by laws written by political leaders. The bottom up view sees institutions instead 
as emerging spontaneously from the social norms, customs, traditions, beliefs, and values of individuals within a society, with the 
written law only formalizing what is already mainly shaped by the attitudes of individuals. The two worldviews have very different 
implications for institutional change. In the top down view, the political leadership can start with a “blank slate”, tearing up the old 
laws and making new laws at any time. The bottom up view sees current institutions as heavily constrained by previous institutions. 
Institutional change in the bottom up view is always gradual, evolutionary rather than revolutionary. These two views also have very 
different implications for the role of economists or other “experts”. In the top down view, there is a heavy burden on economists to 
determine the optimal institutions to recommend to political leaders, using theory and empirics to design new institutions from 
scratch. In the bottom up view, there is a much more specialized role for economists, who at best can recommend desirable 
incremental changes, subject to the constraint that institutional reforms cannot attempt too much without disrupting the functioning of 
the economy by much more than is justified by the benefits of the desirable change. In the top down view, economists recommend 
institutions through pure reason. In the bottom up view, economists express reluctance to make drastic changes to institutions whose 
rationale they cannot fully comprehend, showing respect for the historical evolution that has somehow yielded today’s institutions. 
This is not to advocate the extreme view that what is, is right, only the more modest view that what is, is for a reason. The reason a 
particular institution has emerged will affect the consequences of attempts to change that institutions. The top down view also tends 
to go together with the view that there is one globally unique best set of institutions, toward which all societies are hopefully thought 
to be “developing”. The development economist acts as a cross country communicator of the institutions of the advanced society to 
the less informed in the backward society. The bottom up view of institutions is more open to the possibility that societies evolve 
different institutions even in the long run. These two worldviews have been painted as opposing extremes, which is a caricature. The 
top down view is seldom advocated explicitly, but is implicit in the traditional analysis in aid agencies that sees institutions as 
something the central government must create to make possible the functioning of a market economy.  The apparent effectiveness of 
top down formal institutions in rich societies may still depend on these institutions having evolved from the bottom up. If so, then 
attempting to introduce formal institutions into poor societies where bottom up factors are lacking will not replicate the institutional 
successes of rich countries. The bottom up view of institutions certainly undermines the optimism implied by aid agency 
recommendations that institutions can be rapidly changed from the top by political leaders. Even without a comprehensive theory of 
institutions, historical evidence, contemporary research, and common sense suggest that institutional change is gradual in the large 
majority of cases. Attempts at rapid top down change can even have negative consequences. If that is reality, then an agenda of 
gradual reform that recognizes the constraints of bottom up evolution will lead to more hopeful results than a delusory top down 
attempt to leap to institutional perfection.  (Easterly, Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?, 2008) 
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from an outward-oriented strategy. But as in other developing countries, policymakers had to 
contend with the import-substituting industrialists, who had been supported by the restrictive 
commercial policies of the early 1960s prior to independence. These industrialists were naturally 
opposed to relaxing the trade regime. An economist following the Washington Consensus would 
have advocated across the broad liberalization, without regard to what that might do for the 
precarious political and social balance of the island. Instead, the Mauritian authorities chose the two 
track-strategy. The export processing zone scheme in fact provided a way around the political 
difficulties. The creation of this EPZ generated new opportunities of trade and of employment, 
without taking protection away from the import-substituting groups and from the male workers who 
dominated the established industries. The segmentation of labour markets early on between male 
and female workers, with the latter predominantly employed in the EPZ, was particularly crucial, as 
it prevented the expansion of the EPZ from driving wages up in the rest of the economy, thereby 
disadvantaging import-substituting industries. New profit opportunities were created at the margin, 
while leaving old opportunities undisturbed and there were no identifiable losers. This in turn paved 
the way for the more substantial liberalizations that took place in the mid 1980s and in the 1990s. 
Mauritius found its own way to economic development because it created social and political 
institutions that encouraged participation, negotiation, and compromise. That it did so despite 
inauspicious beginnings and following a path that diverged from orthodoxy says a lot about the 
importance of such institutions. 
A famous account of another African success story is the case of Botswana, which is provided by 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
42 (2003). This paper, in the form of a case study and with the 
help of comparative data analysis and some OLS regressions, shows what can be done with the 
right institutions. Despite adverse initial conditions, including minimal investment during the 
colonial period and high inequality, Botswana achieved development. AJR impute the success of 
this country to its adoption of “good” policies, which were chosen because of the presence of 
“good” institutions. The so called good policies promoted rapid accumulation, investment and the 
socially efficient exploitation of resource rents. But these policies, in turn, resulted from an 
underlying set of institutions, institutions of private property
43 that encouraged investment and 
economic development. They discuss the factors that could account for the distinct institutional 
equilibrium (compared to the other African countries) that emerged in Botswana and identify a 
combination of features that appear potentially relevant to understanding its institutional and 
economic performance. First, Botswana is very rich in natural resource wealth. Second, it had 
unusual pre-colonial political institutions allowing commoners (common men) to make suggestions 
and criticize chiefs. The institutions therefore enabled an unusual degree of participation in the 
political process, and placed restrictions on the political power of the elites. Third, British colonial 
rule was limited, which allowed the pre-colonial institutions to survive to the independence era. 
Fourth, upon independence, the most important rural interests were politically powerful, and it was 
in their economic interest to enforce property rights. Fifth, the post-independence political leaders 
took a number of sensible decisions. Botswana can be seen as an optimistic example of what can be 
done with the appropriate actions towards institutional design, even starting with unfavourable 
initial economic conditions. Despite being a small, agriculturally marginal, tropical nation, in a 
precarious geo-political situation, Botswana experienced rapid development. They think this shows 
what can be done with the right institutions. In Botswana’s case, these institutions emerged in part 
as a result of a unique juxtaposition of a historical condition and political factors. 
                                                 
42 “An African Success Story: Botswana” 
43 Remember that Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson define “good” institutions as corresponding to a social 
organization which ensures that a broad cross-section of the society has effective property rights. Such institutions 
contrast with extractive institutions, where the majority of the population faces a high risk of expropriation by the 
government, the ruling elite or other agents.                   
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Neither the case of Mauritius nor the one of Botswana is related or depends on some form of 
development assistance. Easterly
44 defines development assistance as the combination of money, 
advice, and conditions provided by rich nations and international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which are designed to achieve economic 
development in poor nations. Development economists long have known the answers of how to 
achieve economic development. The problem is that those answers have continued changing over 
time.  
The first problem is related to the actions that achieve economic development. The evolution of the 
“conventional” Wisdom is as follows. In 1950s through the 1970s, development (economic growth) 
was a simple matter of raising the rate of investment to GDP, including public investments for 
roads, dams, irrigation canals, schools, and electricity, as well as private investment. Private 
investment was usually not trusted to do enough or to do the right things, and so there was a strong 
role for the state to facilitate and direct investment, guided by the development experts. But the 
debts accumulated to finance these investments turned out not to be repayable. Middle-income 
countries had borrowed from commercial banks at market rates, while low-income countries had 
loans from official agencies at concessionals rates. Both entered into a long process of rescheduling 
and writing off debt that led to a lost decade for both groups of debtors. The attention shifted toward 
the success of the East Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), which 
combined export orientation and macroeconomic stability. This became the inspiration for structural 
adjustment packages of the IMF, the World Bank, and the “Washington Consensus”
45. The slogan 
was “adjustment with growth”. Loans to finance structural adjustment met the same fate in low-
income countries as the earlier loans to finance investment and the loans could not be repaid. The 
hope the East Asian miracle could be replicated elsewhere with the same policies proved 
unsuccessful and the Washington Consensus gave away to second generation reforms that stressed 
the importance of institutions such as property rights, contract enforcement, democratic 
accountability, and freedom from corruption. Although each shift in the conventional wisdom was 
provoked by the failure of the previous conventional wisdom, the argument was usually that 
previous recommendations were “necessary but not sufficient”. This does not mean that economists 
know nothing about development, or that they know nothing about the many little pieces that 
contribute to development. Good economic analysis of problems in finance, macroeconomics, 
taxation and public spending, health, agriculture, etc. has held up well. Economists are reasonably 
confident that some combination of free markets and good institutions has an excellent historical 
track record of achieving development. It is just that we don’t know which specific actions 
contribute to free markets and good institutions; how all the little pieces fit together. That is, we 
don’t know how to achieve development. 
The second is about the so called development assistance “seen as money with advice” simply 
because of the fact that successful cases of development happening due to a large inflow of aid 
(money) and technical assistance have been hard to find.  
In sum, what actions achieve development are not known. Moreover, the combination of advice and 
aid do not make those actions happen.  
Easterly states that it doesn’t necessarily follow that foreign aid should be eliminated. Once freed 
from the delusion that it can accomplish development, foreign aid could finance piecemeal steps 
aimed at accomplishing particular tasks for which there is clearly a huge demand (to reduce malaria 
deaths, to provide more clean water, to build and maintain roads, to provide scholarships for 
talented but poor students, and so on). It could seek to create more opportunities for poor 
individuals, rather than try to transform poor societies.  
 
 
                                                 
44“Was Development assistance a mistake?”, 2007. 
45 Removing price distorsions, opening up to trade, and correcting macroeconomic imbalances.                   
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4.3.1 But does “democracy” really generate growth?   
 
Having listed the (good) “features” of the participatory political institutions, we need to look at the 
literature that tries to achieve broad empirical results. 
Today all OECD countries are democratic, while many of the non democracies are in the poor parts 
of the world, for example sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. 
Several papers move “in the orbit” of this form of government to understand if democracy tends to 
be a reliable mechanism for generating such desiderable outcome. In this connection, we 
contemplate the works of Rodrik (1999), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Easterly, Gatti, Kurlat 
(2006), Rodrik (2007), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008). 
They provide evidence in support of the following assertions:  
 
•  Democracies yield long-run growth rates that are more predictable. 
 
•  Democracies produce greater short-term stability. 
 
•  Democracies handle adverse shocks much better. 
 
•  Democracies deliver better distributional outcomes. 
 
•  Democratisations have positive effects on growth. 
 
•  Mass killings are less likely at highest levels of democracy. 
 
•  There is no causal effect of income on democracy. 
 
Starting with the first assertion, it is considered a sample of 90 countries during the 1970-1989 
period for the relationship between a country’s level of democracy and its growth rate of GDP per 
capita, after having controlled for initial income, education, and regional effects. Democracy is 
measured on a scale of 0 to 1, using the Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties. 
The slope of the relationship is positive and statistically significant, but it’s not very robust. 
Looking at individual cases, it becomes quickly evident why this is so. Among high growth 
countries, Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea rank low in terms of democracy (during the period 
covered by the sample), and some other countries, like Botswana and Mauritius, have done equally 
well or even better under fairly open political regimes. Poor performances can similarly be found at 
either end of the democracy spectrum: South Africa and Mozambique have done poorly under 
authoritarian regimes, Papua New Guinea and Jamaica under relatively democratic ones. Hence 
mean long run growth rates tend not to depend systematically on political regime type. Rodrik then 
wonders if the cross-national variance in long run growth performance is smaller under democracies 
than it is under autocracies. He divides the country sample into two roughly equal sized groups, 
calling those with values of the democracy index less than 0.5 “autocracies” and those with values 
greater or equal to 0.5 “democracies”. Looking at the coefficients of variation of long run growth 
rates, he finds that they are higher for autocracies than democracies. Since countries with 
authoritarian regimes tend to have lower incomes, this result reflects the greater randomness in the 
long run growth rates of poor countries
46. 
For the second assertion, the relationship between regime type and volatility in short run economic 
performance, Rodrik
47 focuses on three national accounts aggregates: real GDP, real consumption 
and investment. Volatility is measured by calculating the standard deviation of annual growth rates 
                                                 
46 Rodrik,“One Economics, Many Recipes”, 2007. 
47 “One Economics, Many Recipes”, 2007.                   
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of the relevant aggregate over the 1960-1989 period.  Then each measure of volatility is regressed 
on a number of independent variables, including the measure of democracy
48. The estimated 
coefficient on the measure of democracy is negative and statistically significant in all cases. A 
movement from pure autocracy to pure democracy is associated with reductions in the standard 
deviations of growth rates of GDP, consumption, and investment. In particular, long- standing 
democracies such as India, Costa Rica, Malta, and Mauritius have experienced significantly less 
volatility than countries like Syria, Chile, or Iran, even after controlling for country size and 
external shocks. Moreover, causality seems to run directly from regime type to volatility. Therefore, 
the evidence suggests that democracy is conducive to lower volatility in economic performance. 
Considering the third assertion, the question Rodrik poses is whether democratic and participatory 
institutions have helped adjustments to shocks
49 of external origin. Rodrik
50 (1999) explores how 
social cleavages and domestic institutions of conflict management mediate the effects of shocks on 
economic performance and shows that the adjustment to shocks will tend to be worse in countries 
with deep latent social conflicts and with poor institutions of conflict management. Consequently, 
such countries will experience larger declines in growth rates following shocks. These ideas are 
tested by regressing the change in growth on indicators of latent conflict and on proxies for 
institutions of conflict management. The evidence shows that there is a systematic relationship 
between ethnic cleavages and the growth decline: countries with greater ethnic and linguistic 
fragmentation experienced larger declines in economic growth. Indeed, Easterly and Levine
51 had 
already shown the economic importance of ethnic diversity by demonstrating that it helps account 
for “Africa’s growth tragedy”. In fact, Africa’s poor growth is associated with low schooling, 
political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high 
government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. High ethnic diversity is closely associated with 
low schooling, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, and 
insufficient infrastructure.  
Therefore, the interest in democratic institutions derives from the idea that such institutions provide 
ways of regulating and managing social conflicts through participatory means and the rule of law, 
and hence dissipate the adverse consequences of external shocks. In empirical terms, to test this 
hypothesis, it is necessary to see whether the measure of democracy used, is related to changes in 
growth rates subsequent to the shocks. The relationship is highly significant: countries with greater 
political freedoms during the 1970s experienced lower declines in economic growth when their 
trend growth rate changed. It is possible to see that the hardest hit countries tend to be those with 
few political liberties, such as Syria, Algeria, Panama, and Gabon. Countries with open political 
regimes, such as Costa Rica, Botswana, Barbados, and India, did much better. These results are 
perhaps surprising in view of the presumption that it takes strong, autonomous governments to 
undertake the policy adjustments required in the face of diversity. They are less surprising from the 
perspective that adjustment to shocks requires managing social conflicts, and democratic 
institutions are useful institutions of conflict management. Rodrik also investigates the relationship 
between declines in growth and three other aspects of political regime: the degree of institutional 
(de jure) independence of the executive, the degree of operational (de facto) independence of the 
executive, and the degree to which nonelites can access political institutions. These three variables 
come from the Polity III data. These three indicators are correlated with the Freedom House 
measure of democracy: independence of the executive tends to be lower in democracies, and 
avenues of nonelite participation are larger. But there are interesting exceptions. The United States 
ranks highest not only on the democracy index, but also in the degree of institutional (de jure) 
independence of the executive. Other democracies with relatively autonomous executives (de jure) 
                                                 
48 The other independent variables are log per capita GDP, log population, exposure to external risk and dummies for 
Latin America, East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and OECD. 
49 The shocks considered are those happened from the middle to late 1970s. 
50 “Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflicts, and growth collapses” 
51 “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions”, 1997.                   
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are France, Canada, and Costa Rica. By contrast, South Africa is coded as having had (during the 
1970s) little democracy and little executive autonomy. A further question in the literature is whether 
an insulated and autonomous executive is necessary for the implementation of economic reforms. 
The results show that more significant growth declines are associated with greater institutional and 
operational independence of the executive and lower levels of political access by nonelites. This 
means that political regimes with lower executive autonomy and more participatory institutions 
handle exogenous shocks better. This might be part of the explanation for why democracies 
experience less economic instability over the long run (as seen before). Recent experience in East 
Asia strongly validates these results. South Korea and Thailand, with more open and participatory 
political regimes, handled the Asian financial crisis significantly better than Indonesia (Rodrik 
1999). Democracy helped the first two countries manage the crisis for at least three reasons. First, it 
facilitated a smooth transfer of power from a set of politicians to a new group of government 
leaders. Second, democracy imposed mechanisms of participation, consultation, and bargaining, 
enabling policy makers to create the consensus needed to undertake the necessary policy 
adjustments decisively. Third, because democracy provides for institutionalized mechanisms of 
“voice”, the Korean and Thai institutions obviated the need for riots, protests, and other kinds of 
disruptive actions by affected groups. 
Moving to the fourth assertion, democracy makes an important difference to the distribution of the 
enterprise surplus in the manufacturing sectors of national economies. 
Rodrik
52 wonders if political institutions contribute to the determination of the level of wages and 
finds that it is so. Controlling for labour productivity, income levels, and other possible 
determinants, he finds there is a robust and significant association between the extent of democratic 
rights in a country and the level of wages received by workers in manufactures. The association 
exists both across countries and over time within countries. Countries with greater political 
participation than would have been predicted from their income levels, such as India, Israel, Malta, 
and Cyprus, also have correspondingly higher wages relative to productivity. Some countries at the 
other end of the spectrum (with lower values for the democracy index and low wages) are Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Mexico. Moving from Mexico’s level of democracy to that of the United 
States is associated with an increase in wages of about 30 percent. In particular, the relationship is 
causal; that is, changes in political regime cause a redistribution of the enterprise surplus toward 
workers. One problem is that a prolabour distribution in manufacturing can go hand in hand with a 
more regressive distribution overall. This could be the case where prolabour policies create a sort of 
labour aristocracy to the detriment of the rural sector worker. But the relationship between 
democracy and economy-wide inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) is negative. More 
participatory regimes produce greater equality not only within the modern (manufacturing) sector, 
but throughout the economy. And they do so without cost to economic growth and producing 
greater stability (Rodrik 2007). 
Looking at the fifth statement, Rodrik and Wacziarg
53, referring to a body of literature that thinks 
democratization in developing countries produces political instability, ethnic conflict and poor 
economic outcomes, show that the data do not support this view. They use annual frequency data to 
examine within-country effects of democratization on economic growth and include time and 
country fixed effects to distinguish the impact of democratization per se from other determinants. 
Their analysis reveals that major democratic transitions have a positive effect on economic growth 
in the short run. This is especially true for the poorest countries of the world and those that are 
marked by sharp ethnic divisions. Democratizations tend to follow periods of low growth rather 
than precede them. Moreover, democratic transitions are associated with a decline in growth 
volatility.  
                                                 
52 “Democracies Pay Higher Wages”, 1999. 
53 “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?”, 2005.                   
  43
For the sixth, Easterly, Gatti, Kurlat
54 study the relationship between the occurrence and magnitude 
of episodes of mass killing and the levels of development and democracy across countries and over 
time, looking at the determinants of mass killings of unarmed civilians in the period from 1820 to 
1998. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, using historical records and sources, they 
construct a new dataset listing occurrence and magnitude of episodes of mass killing by the state 
over the XIXth and XXth century. Then, they analyze the association between the probability that 
an episode of mass killing occurs and the levels of development and democracy
55 of a country. 
Their main independent variables are average per capita GDP over the decade and the level of 
democracy. Overall, they find that episodes of mass killing are more likely at intermediate levels of 
income and less frequent at the highest levels of democracy. 
Finally, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared
56, revisit the relationship between income per 
capita (log GDP per capita) and democracy
57 and focus on the causal effect of income on 
democracy. In this paper they argue that, although income and democracy are positively correlated, 
there is no evidence of a causal effect of the first on democracy
58. Regressions that include country 
fixed effects and/or instrumental variable regressions show no evidence of a causal effect of income 
on democracy over the postwar era or the past 100 years. These results shed considerable doubt on 
the conventional wisdom that income per capita is a key determinant of democracy and that a 
general increase in income per capita brings improvements in institutions. At the same time, these 
results raise the question of why there is a positive cross-country correlation between income and 
democracy today. This is, they say, likely to be because the political and economic development 
paths are interwoven and are jointly affected by various factors; the development path a society 
embarks upon is partly influenced by its experience during certain critical junctures which might 
include the early stages of colonization for former colonies, the aftermath of independence or the 
founding of a nation, the epoch of collapse of feudalism for Western European nations, the age of 
industrialization and the periods of significant ideological shocks such as the Reformation, the 
Enlightment, or the rise of Islam. Some countries appear to have embarked upon a development 
path associated with democracy and economic growth, while others pursued a path based on 
dictatorship, repression, and more limited growth. Consistent with this, they have shown that 
historical sources of variation in development paths are responsible for much of the statistical 
association between long-run economic and political changes. 
 
 
4.4 Political and Economic Institutions: attempts to distinguish 
 
A deeper, closer, examination of the literature reveals that both political and economic institutions 
are called generically “institutions”, without a formal distinction. In the foregone section, Rodrik 
and, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, see a particular set of political institutions as the cause of 
development in Mauritius and Botswana. However, from a theoretical point of view, the 
relationship between the two has not been set. Moreover, the endogeneity of institutions has not 
been completely explained.  
Just two works take some steps forward.  
                                                 
54“Development, democracy, and mass killings”, 2006. 
55 The democracy index ranges from 1 to 10. The scale is constructed additively, using the following variables: PAR-
COMP (competitiveness of partecipation: extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for 
political expression); XRCOMP ( Executive recruitment competition: extent to which executives are chosen through 
competitive elections); XROPEN (Executive recruitment openness: opportunity for non elites to attain executive 
office); XCONST (Executive constraints: operational independence of chief executive). (source POLITY project). 
56 “Income and Democracy”, 2008. 
57 Democracy is measured by the Freedom House Political Rights Index and the Polity Composite Democracy Index 
58 Their measures of democracy is the Freedom House Political Rights Index and the Polity Democracy and Autocracy 
Index.                   
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A basic framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries is outlined 
by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
59. Their hypothesis is that economic institutions are 
determined as collective choices of the society, for their economic consequences. Because all 
individuals and groups don’t prefer the same set of economic institutions, as they lead to different 
distributions of resources, there will be a conflict of interest among various groups over the choice 
of economic institutions. Whichever group has more political power is likely to secure the set of 
economic institutions it prefers. They argue that distribution of political power in society is also 
endogenous and distinguish between two components of political power, namely de jure and de 
facto political power. De jure political power refers to power that originates from political 
institutions
60 in society; political institutions, similarly to economic institutions, determine the 
constraints on and the incentives of the key actors, but this time in the political sphere. De facto 
political power is the power a group of individuals has, even if it is not allocated by political 
institutions. It has two sources: it depends on the ability of the group to solve its collective action 
problem and on its economic resources. 
Political institutions determine the distribution of the jure political power, which in turn affects the 
choice of economic institutions
61. Political institutions, though slow changing, are also endogenous. 
Since political institutions are seen as collective choices too, the distribution of political power in 
society is the key determinant of their evolution. This creates a tendency for persistence: political 
institutions allocate de jure political power, and those who hold political power influence the 
evolution of political institutions, and they will opt to maintain the political institutions that give 
them political power. 
Working in a historical perspective, in The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, 
and Economic Growth (2005) they provide and document an interesting fact related to the process 
of European growth, that shows the working of this framework. Between 1500 and 1850, the 
growth of nations with access to the Atlantic, and the growth of Atlantic ports, account for most of 
the differential growth of Western Europe relative to Eastern Europe. Their hypothesis is that 
Atlantic trade generated large profits for commercial interests in favour of institutional change in 
countries that met two crucial preconditions: easy access to the Atlantic and nonabsolutist initial 
institutions. These profits moved the balance of political power away from the monarchy and 
induced significant reforms in political institutions, which introduced more secure property rights 
and paved the way for further innovations in economic institutions. 
They construct also a model
62 to study the implications of changes in political institutions for 
economic institutions and economic outcomes. The main idea is that equilibrium economic 
institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political 
institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but the elite can intensify their 
investments in de facto political power to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. Thus 
equilibrium changes in political institutions may have little or no effect on the equilibrium 
distribution of economic institutions.
63 
Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi
64 (2004) also make an explicit distinction between political and 
economic institutions and develop a paper whose emphasis is only on the endogeneity of political 
institutions. They look at the institutional design, arguing that a fundamental aspect of that is how 
much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot 
be restrained, they say, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority; if a leader faces too many 
                                                 
59 “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”, 2004. 
60 Examples of political institutions include the form of government, democracy vs. dictatorship, and the extent of 
constraints on politicians and political elites. 
61This framework, with political institutions influencing economic institutions, which then determine economic 
outcomes, introduces the important concept of a hierarchy of institutions. 
62 “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions”, 2007. 
63 They  focus on symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria and use the optimization language. 
64 “Endogenous Political Institutions”                   
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ex post checks and balances, legislative action is often blocked. They provide a model
65 of the 
trade-off between delegation of power and ex post control of politicians: they model delegation of 
power or “insulation” of leaders as the share of votes that can block the leader ex post when he tries 
to implement legislation. A Constitution that establishes a high share of votes needed to block 
implies that leaders are more insulated. The optimal amount of insulation depends on politico-
economic features such as the size of the aggregate improvement from reform, the aggregate 
uncertainties over the outcome from reform, the degree of polarization of society, the individual 
degree of risk aversion, the availability and efficiency of fiscal transfers, and the degree of 
protection of property rights against expropriation. They discuss how the optimal choice of 
insulation would or would not be adopted in a system where the choice was not made completely 
behind a veil of ignorance or only a fraction of the population had a voice in the choice of 
institutions. One especially interesting case is a situation in which those who choose a Constitution 
are also those who know who will control political office after the Constitution is ratified. In this 
case, what is optimal for them may not be optimal for society as a whole. In particular, in a 
fragmented society, while it would be optimal to choose less insulation to guarantee a “voice” to all 
groups, in practice an especially powerful group may take a hold of the constitutional process and 
imposes its rule. Finally, they test their analytical model by means of a cross-country empirical 
analysis. They focus on the relationship between polarization (for which they use two indexes of 
socio-ethnic fractionalisation) and various measures of insulation, that is, whether the regime is 
autocratic rather than democratic, whether it is more presidential, or whether the voting system 
involves majority rules instead of proportional rules. From the regressions shown, there is evidence 
that various indices of insulations are positively correlated with measure of fractionalisation and 
















                                                 
65 They consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals. Members of this polity will differ ex post on 
how much they benefit from policy actions (reforms) which may be implemented. If no reforms is implemented, all 
individuals obtain the same income.                   
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5 Conclusion and Extensions 
 
Exploring the literature has certainly been exciting and at the same time difficult. It has been 
exciting to discover how much has been said and how much remains to be done; difficult, to put all 
these pieces together and find a frame for them. Aware of the “dangerous” task, I have decided to 
organise and synthesize all the contributions in order to make clear the paths the economic thinking 
has undertaken and let the literature speak. My voice could mingle with the single results and 
puzzle.  
But now, it’s time for me to speak. 
What do we know about the link between institutions and growth?  
From section 3, we have learned that property rights institutions are very important, more important 
than contracting institutions, and that there are many attempts to explain the incomes differences 
between countries: someone thinks of the colonial experiment, someone thinks of a country’s legal 
origins and some other thinks of human capital as engine to “right” institutions. The colonial 
experiment is very suggestive, it goes back in history, and is able to show the primacy of 
institutions (vs. geography) as unique fundamental cause of income differences; however, it is not 
plain how the Europeans’ choices have survived and the behaviour of the pattern of institutions 
started with those choices. The study of single cases could find the answer: other forces, maybe 
pointed by the context, can be used as independent variables and panel models could show the 
incremental change of institutions.  
Also the historical origins of a country’s laws are correlated with economic outcomes. These studies 
have considered the effects of legal origins on “rules and regulations” (called “institutions”), which 
in turn have impact on economic outcomes. Legal origins influence procedural formalism, judicial 
independence, regulation of entry, government ownership of the media, labour laws, conscription, 
company law and securities law, bankruptcy law, government ownership of banks. And these 
“institutions” have effects on the economic outcomes they might influence. But the way from legal 
origins to economic outcomes, undoubtedly powerful, seems to miss something. What about low 
incomes, English legal origins, countries like Sudan, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia? Botswana is also 
an English legal origins country but, as Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson clearly state, what 
determined its “success story” was a particular set of initial conditions, namely some political 
institutions. Hence, though legal origins may affect the regulation environment of a country and, 
then, some economic outcomes, they don’t account for the whole story. The colonial experiment is 
more coherent and the case of Botswana suggests that we have to look at the interaction of 
colonialism with pre-colonial institutions to understand a country’s path. What we need is an 
intimate understanding of the individual characteristics of the society. 
The view that focuses on the role of human capital, the last attempt, says that the claim “institutions 
cause economic growth” is non-existent. However, their reasoning is not completely stringent and 
at the end the result they achieve is another one, namely that both human capital and political 
institutions affect the evolution of the political features. After showing a relationship between 
economic growth and assessments of institutional quality (constraints on the executive, risk of 
expropriation, government effectiveness and autocracy) over a period, they study decade by decade 
the relationship between economic growth, initial period education and initial period constraints on 
executive, concluding that the initial constraints have no predictive power for subsequent economic 
growth. But, unless their objective is explicitly to refute, it is not clear why initial executive 
constraints should affect directly subsequent economic performance. This variable is a political 
variable and even if often used as a proxy for property rights institutions, it shouldn’t be forgotten 
what it means. These constraints are referred to political power, and political power affects a 
country’s policy design. Couldn’t it be that where these constraints are high, where there is 
democracy, there is a higher level of redistribution and people are free? From this perspective, it is 
straightforward that people in a dictatorial system are not free and poorly educated. Therefore, the                   
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timing of the analysis should be different; constraints on the executive at time t, influence the level 
of human capital from t+1, and then economic growth. Probably, the negative sign for the 
coefficient of the initial constraints on executive variable may simply reflect a problem of 
collinearity. 
The others papers highlight the different ways human capital is important for growth but they don’t 
explore how and which institutions affects human capital. Their interaction deserves future 
attention.   
Section 4 tells about the role of reforms, of policy making, and the role of different types of 
institutions. Although this branch of literature moves some step forward in order to put things in the 
right place, some extensions are needed. From this section, we understand that reforms are 
important, their impact is highly dependent on circumstances, that they should start from 
discovering the distortions, which deserve the most attention from policy makers, and end 
strengthening the institutional infrastructure to avoid future problems. We can read this picture 
saying that a country’s economic performance is the result of the combination of market, policy and 
institutions. In this perspective, the institutions listed by Rodrik, the ones I called functional, and 
others like banking institutions, enterprise institutions, competition institutions, should be seen as 
economic institutions, that is, more close to the economy. But we have seen that to build locally 
adapted, economic institutions, there must be a participatory political system: a particular political 
system may help build better economic institutions and then these affect the economic performance. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, and Alesina et al. have tried to explain this. The AJR’s attempt 
is more complete, the other one focusing only on political institutions doesn’t explain the effect on 
economic institutions. 
From this review, a few suggestions for future research stand out. 
First, reading the different contributions of the literature, the most striking thing is that 
“institutions” can take on different meanings: they can be alternatively political assessments, 
economic assessments and policy assessments. When we talk about institutions, we should explain 
which dimension we are thinking of. Otherwise the claim “institutions affect or don’t affect growth” 
means nothing. Because it is very difficult to draw the line, more work should be devoted to 
improve the classification of the relevant measures and the definition of the part of the institutional 
environment under study. 
Second, a theory of institutions, a coherent and agreed upon way of thinking, that organises the 
concepts arisen is needed. 
Third, the problem of the endogeneity of institutions should be read differently. Empirically, the 
economic institutions have been instrumented by various correlates of the European influence: trade 
shares, settler mortality, language, geography or climate. These studies are cross-sectional and the 
instruments are all time invariant. More emphasis should be placed upon panel models and different 
instruments should be found. For instance, political instruments could be used to examine the 
hierarchy of institutions hypothesis. 
Fourth, a fundamental direction for future research is to go back in history and find experiments of 
radical change of institutions in order to study the subsequent patterns. 
Fifth, a better understanding of the role of economic policy and its relationship with the political 
system is needed. This should be pursued empirically and conceptually.  
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